THE NEW DEMOCRAT

$4.00

WINTER 2000

BLUEPRINT

IDEAS FOR A NEW CENTURY

National Security in the 21st Century

War & PEACE

ARE WE READY?

SAM NUNN on new cyberthreats

JOSEPH NYE on the Asian triangle

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ on when to intervene

WILL MARSHALL on democratic realism

ADM. WILLIAM A. OWENS on modernization

ROBERT SATLOFF on the volatile Middle East

LARRY DIAMOND on spreading democracy

PLUS PENN'S POLL:

Americans want to stay engaged

05

0 74470 77560 7

www.dlc.org/blueprint

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



BLUEPRINT
for national security

A NATO AWACS PLANE (Airborne Warning System) prepares to take off from an airbase in Italy that was a hub for the bombing campaign in Yugoslavia.

Cover: A U.S. Army soldier watches an Apache Helicopter take off from a base in Albania, July 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Inside

The Cold War order was organized around the clash of opposing theories about the best way to order human affairs. Its successor is organized increasingly around globalization — the growing economic, political, and intellectual integration of nations by the time- and distance-compressing forces of microchip technology, real-time satellite communications, the Internet, and international commerce.

— *Will Marshall,* **DEMOCRATIC REALISM** Page 6

The fact that we cannot intervene everywhere doesn't mean we should intervene nowhere.... In Rwanda, the refusal of the international community to take steps to stop the genocide, precisely because it could have been halted at a minimum cost in blood and treasure, was our greatest moral failure of the last half century.

— *Stephen J. Solarz,* **WHEN TO GO IN** Page 14

A computer hacker who called himself the Phantom Dialer seized control of important networks around the world — at universities, corporations, banks, federal agencies, and military facilities. He even hacked into top secret weapons sites. When an FBI investigative team finally traced the hacking to a 20-year-old in Portland, Ore., they discovered he had severe brain damage from viral hepatitis.

— *Sam Nunn,* **GET READY FOR CYBERWAR** Page 34

We should grasp opportunities to attack Saddam where they will seriously damage his hold on power. With sufficient provocation, we should mount debilitating air strikes on the pillars of the regime: the secret police, Saddam's personal guard units, and the Iraqi command-and-control system. And, given Saddam's record, the provocations will surely come.

— *Robert Satloff,* **THE BIGGEST ALBATROSS** Page 48

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW DEMOCRAT
BLUEPRINT

Publisher
Al From

Editor
Peter Ross Range

Senior Editor
Kerry Tremain

Issue Editors
Will Marshall, Steven J. Nider

Senior Editorial Consultant
William A. Galston

Art Director
Kate Rader

Contributing Editors
Chuck Alston, Holly Page

Board of Advisors
Bernard Schwartz, Chair
Donald A. Baer
John S. Dyson
Christopher Gabrieli
William A. Galston
S. Robert Levine
Dave McCurdy
Regis McKenna
Charles Moskos
David Osborne
Mark J. Penn
Sanford R. Robertson
Thomas B. Ross
Howard Rubin
Mark R. Warner
Daniel Yankelovich
Dorothy Zinberg

Design and Layout
Bloom & Mertz

Production/Editing
Douglas Ortiz

Copy Editors
Virginia Cope
Hilda Baker

With thanks to:
Anne Saunders, Megan Susman, Michael Yates, Hans Wuerfmannsdobler

Blueprint: Ideas for a New Century is published quarterly by the Democratic Leadership Council, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20003. Telephone 202-546-0007. The Democratic Leadership Council is a 501 (c) (4) nonprofit organization. Subscription to the series is $20. Bulk postage paid at Washington, D.C. The ideas and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent official positions of the Democratic Leadership Council, its members, or the Blueprint Board of Advisors. Send all correspondence, remittances, changes of address, and subscription inquiries to: Blueprint, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20003.
©1999 by the Democratic Leadership Council.

CORRECTION FROM BLUEPRINT 4
Peter Hutchinson's name was written incorrectly on the cover. We regret the error and apologize.

The National Security Issue 5

4 EDITOR'S NOTE
by Peter Ross Range

Changing World

6 DEMOCRATIC REALISM: THE THIRD WAY
by Will Marshall
Progressive Internationalism demands bold American engagement with the world.

14 WHEN TO GO IN
by Stephen J. Solarz
Humanitarian intervention must be politically viable. A three-part formula.

20 DEFUSING TODAY'S DOOMSDAY MACHINES
by Michael Krepon
The Cold War is over, but the world bristles with new nuclear dangers.

24 REVOLUTIONIZING WARFARE
by Admiral William A. Owens
Kosovo showed that information technology is the cutting edge of today's war.

30 BUYING SMART
by Keith B. Bickel
We can't modernize by budgeting for Cold War Lite.

Emerging Threats

34 GET READY FOR CYBERWAR
by Sam Nunn
The Senate's former defense expert shows that *weapons of mass disruption* may endanger us as much as *weapons of mass destruction.*

38 *And:* E-TERROR IN CYBERSPACE *by Peter A. Wilson*

40 THE BIO-CHEM THREAT
by Zachary Selden
Saddam still has secret factories, and Aum Shinrikyo showed how to attack with gas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

page 6

page 24

page 40

Regional Threats

44 NOBODY LOST RUSSIA
by Michael A. McFaul
Russia is not too big to fail, but the blackmail game should end.

48 THE NEXT TURBULENT ZONE
by Robert Satloff
The Middle East faces upheavals in leadership, lagging globalization, and nuclear proliferation.
Plus: Arab/Israeli peace
Iran's upheaval
Saddam's shakiness

58 SHAPING THE NEW PACIFIC TRIANGLE
by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
China and Japan are critical to U.S. interests and a strategic Asian balance.

Progressive Internationalism

64 PROMOTING *REAL* DEMOCRACY
by Larry Diamond
Democracy is spreading as never before, but its structures are often wobbly and illiberal.

70 THE PRICE OF LEADERSHIP
by Steven J. Nider
Some complain that international engagement costs too much. But it may be the best investment America makes.

72 PENN'S POLL
by Mark J. Penn
People to Government: Stay engaged. Americans want leaders to lead. But they don't want the United States to be the world's cop.

Visit Blueprint online at: http://www.dlc.org/blueprint.
We welcome your correspondence.
The email address is: blueprint@dlc.org.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America's role in a dangerous world

"The Cold War is over. But are we ready for the next one?"

Entering the new millennium, America's standing in the world has never been higher.

Our democratic beliefs have seized the day. Our free market system is increasingly the international norm. Our military, post-Kosovo, is the dominant force in the world.

Globalization, not ideology, is the organizing principle of the new world order.

Does that means we're doing everything right?

Hardly. Any clear-eyed look at our national security posture — and we hope this issue of BLUEPRINT is just that — recognizes that we have a defense system perfectly attuned to winning the last war. Whether our military is up to the challenges of the 21st century is in question, as our distinguished panel of authors makes plain.

For starters, Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, writes that we need a new security framework. He proposes one that avoids the false choices of today's raging left-right debate over isolation vs. protectionism, multilateralism vs. unilateralism and over a moralizing foreign policy vs. one motivated chiefly by power politics. Marshall posits an approach called Democratic Realism — a mix of values and interests, economic and security concerns, and national strength, as well as international cooperation.

Within this framework, much remains to be done to turn America's defense into the fighting force of the future. Our writers note the many hurdles we face. The American military is still skewed toward a Cold War model. Our budgeting priorities are locked into political inertia in Congress and the Pentagon, preserving old weapons systems and force structures. Entrenched bureaucracies still throttle the modernization debate. Self-protective career fiefdoms stifle new ideas and "leap ahead" technologies.

After years of discussion, service rivalries still block the creation of a lean, focused joint-operational military.

Against this backdrop, we've embraced a new doctrine of humanitarian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LOOSE NUKES: Removing a Soviet-era intercontinental missile in Ukraine.

interventions — from Somalia to East Timor — without a clear set of guidelines for when to stay out and when to go in. Stephen J. Solarz suggests a three-part formula for decision-making.

The Cold War is over. But are we ready for the next one? Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn explains how digital attacks from cyberspace can outflank our traditional defenses and wreak as much havoc as weapons of mass destruction. Russia's relative weakness is in fact a new nuclear danger, as its fissile stockpile remains insufficiently controlled and accounted for. Nuclear proliferation, in the wake of the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is again high on the agenda.

We also pay special attention to the Middle East, which faces new turbulence as its aging leadership changes, its economies fall behind the globalization curve, and a new nuclear threat emerges. Iraq could once again be the next president's greatest albatross.

Finally, presidential pollster Mark Penn's survey at the end of the magazine echoes Will Marshall's call for robust internationalism. Americans believe we should stay engaged in the world, not pull back.

We hope you will be engaged by the debate presented here. If you want to join in, send letters to the editor to *blueprint@dlc.org*, and they will be posted at www.dlc.org/blueprint.

Our next issue, to greet the new millennium, will address one of America's central issues in the upcoming presidential election: health care. We invite you to join us again.

— *Peter Ross Range*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic realism: the third way

by Will Marshall

FROM ENDING WELFARE TO BANISHING DEFICITS and reinventing government, President Clinton's Third Way innovations have reshaped America's domestic agenda. But what about U.S. relations with the rest of the world? Is there a Third Way in international affairs?

Though less sharply defined than its domestic counterpart, a new synthesis on foreign and security policy is beginning to emerge. Its outlines were evident in the U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo — a policy consciously based on a mix of moral values and security interests with the parallel goals of halting a humanitarian tragedy and ensuring NATO's credibility as an effective force for regional stability.

The new outlook is based as well on several core premises about the post-Cold War world:

- That economic integration and competition have moved to center stage in global politics.
- That encouraging the spread of political and economic freedom around the world serves America's strategic interests.
- That U.S. diplomacy should combine military strength with multilateral means of advancing our aims in a multipolar world.

This blending of values and interests, economic and security concerns, and national strength and international cooperation is at the heart of Democratic Realism, a new foreign policy framework we have proposed for the 21st century. ➔

Will Marshall is president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

ENGAGEMENT FOR VALUES as well as security: U.S. troops passing through Macedonia on their way to Kosovo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Progressive internationalism demands bold American engagement with the world for moral *and* security reasons. It avoids the false choice between conservative isolationism and liberal protectionism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Today's progressive internationalists are both tough-minded in defending our national interests and unashamed to affirm America's special mission as a beacon of individual liberty and democracy for the world."

In the decade since the Berlin Wall fell, two big events have weakened the internationalist consensus that shaped and sustained U.S. policy from the 1940s on. One was the shift from a known Soviet menace to a world of smaller but more diffuse and unpredictable threats. This has led some Americans to conclude that the globe-girdling alliances and institutions we built after World War II now confer more burdens than benefits on the world's sole remaining superpower.

The second event was the accelerating emergence of the "new economy" based on new information technologies, communications networks, and global markets that never sleep. The economic volatility and insecurity unleashed by globalization have sparked a backlash against expanding trade and deepening economic integration.

With communism safely consigned to history's dustbin, many Republicans in particular are withdrawing from the internationalist camp. Congressional Republicans opposed U.S. intervention in the Balkans, with GOP House Whip Tom DeLay going so far as to denounce NATO's bombing of Serbia as "Clinton's war." They have also slashed funding for U.S. international operations and international peacekeeping efforts, blocked payment of America's arrears to the United Nations, and killed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. At the same time, the GOP has voted to increase defense spending over Pentagon requests and has pressed for a comprehensive missile defense system. Its actions prompted National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to accuse Republican congressional leaders of favoring a "survivalist foreign policy."

As neo-isolationism assails U.S. global leadership from the right, a virulent new strain of protectionism erodes it from the left. Egged on by labor and left-wing activists who see globalization as a plot by multinational corporations to exploit cheap labor and escape tough environmental laws, most congressional Democrats voted against the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, they have refused to grant President Clinton — a fellow Democrat presiding over the strongest U.S. economy in 30 years — the power to negotiate major new trade agreements and put them on a legislative "fast track." Joined by right-wing protectionist Pat Buchanan, who is seeking the nomination of the independent Reform Party, the anti-globalists have brought progress on trade liberalization to a screeching halt in the United States and are threatening to disrupt a crucial meeting of the 134-nation World Trade Organization later this month in Seattle.

Democratic Realism seeks to counter the growing trends toward neo-isolationism and "globaphobia." In an update of the liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy, it calls for the bold exercise of American power — on both the economic and security fronts — to shape the new international system that is finally emerging from the aftermath of the Cold War.

Like their predecessors a half-century ago, today's progressive internationalists are both tough-minded in defending our national interests and unashamed to affirm America's special mission as a beacon of individual liberty and democracy for the world. Recognizing the reality of interdependence, they envision new structures of global cooperation aimed at keeping the peace, spreading prosperity, and confronting common problems that spill over national borders.

Americans have learned from hard experience that energetic global engagement better protects our far-flung interests than does standing aloof from the world and hoping we can somehow dodge the fallout when foreign economies or regimes collapse, wars break out, or civil strife rages in other countries. They know they need not make the false choices of the left-right debate: multilateralism vs. unilateralism; a moralizing foreign policy or one motivated solely by power politics.

In survey after survey, Americans have supported our country's leadership in the world while rejecting go-it-alone-ism. The latest Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll found that 61 percent of the public favors active U.S. engagement in the world. Far from sharing the right's suspicion of multilateral action, the public expresses a strong

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preference for it: 57 percent feel the United States should take part in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and 72 percent say the United States should not respond to a foreign crisis if it lacks support from other nations. The public also strongly supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty recently rejected by Senate Republicans (see Mark Penn's Poll, page 72). This suggests that most Americans favor international cooperation to reduce common security threats and are not prepared to seek refuge in the illusory safety of "Fortress America."

Despite its often reactive and hesitant conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the Clinton administration has embraced many of the core tenets of Democratic Realism. For example, its staunch support for open markets and trade expansion under common global rules has underscored the intimate link between U.S. economic leadership abroad and our prosperity at home. Its calls for democratic enlargement and NATO expansion have explicitly tied our security to the gradual spread of free enterprise and democratic self-rule. And its willingness to intervene in humanitarian crises from Somalia to the Balkans shows not only America's determination to lead but also its commitment to what British Prime Minister Tony Blair has called a *new doctrine of international community*:

"By this I mean the explicit recognition that today — more than ever before — we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration, and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavor. Just as within domestic politics, the notion of community — the belief that partnership and cooperation are essential to advance self-interest — is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can be solved without intense international cooperation."

Where Do We Stand? The Emerging World Order

At the turn of the last decade, following the collapse of communism and the successful allied operation against Iraq's Saddam Hussein, President Bush proclaimed a New World Order. In fact, only toward the end of the decade, riding the wave of the information revolution, did a new order begin to assert itself. It is based not on the old balance-of-power equation, but on the key pillars of globalization, democracy, American pre-eminence, and collective problem-solving.

Globalization has replaced ideology at the center of international relations. The Cold War order was organized around the clash of opposing theories about the best way to order human affairs. Its successor is organized increasingly around globalization — the growing economic, political, and intellectual integration of nations by the time- and ➔

GLOBALIZATION, NOT IDEOLOGY: Cell phones rented by Grameen Bank serve grassroots globalization in Bangladesh.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MULTILATERALISM: The United States should not be hesitant to use its power alone when necessary. Peacekeeping with allies is better. American, British and French troops in Bosnia.

"History shows that democratic governments, constrained by public opinion, competing domestic interests, and accountable political institutions, are less likely to start wars and more inclined to cooperate with other countries and adhere to international agreements and norms."

distance-compressing forces of microchip technology, real-time satellite communications, the Internet, and international commerce.

Although globalization is more than an economic phenomenon, a nation's power today is more likely to be denominated in the coin of economic and technological dynamism than in tanks, missiles, and manpower. In the Information Age, countries with second-rate economies will not be able to field first-rate defense forces. Russia's plight highlights this dramatic shift in the geometrics of power. Moscow still has enough nuclear weapons to destroy America many times over and make the rubble bounce. But in economic terms, Russia is much less imposing, ranking with Peru and South Africa in per capita wealth.

The global information economy is changing the nature of international politics in another, perhaps more profound, way by devaluing some of the things nations have traditionally fought over: territory and natural resources. In the new economy, intangible knowledge is increasingly the wealth of nations. That means the new requisites of world power and influence are open, dynamic economies, a strong scientific-technical base, and highly skilled and motivated workers. Of course, material resources still matter and America will continue to regard access to oil as a vital national interest. But history's trajectory can be seen in the widening gap between tiny but dynamic Israel and its larger Arab neighbors, oil-rich but impoverished and technologically backward.

Democracy is the prevailing political standard. As the horrifically destructive 20th century closes, we seem to have reached the end not of history but of ideology. Having withstood convulsive challenges from a succession of "isms," liberal democracy has emerged with unrivaled moral prestige. The democratic camp is larger and stronger than ever in history. This does not mean that all other countries will now evolve in lock step toward Western-style democracy or that the United States should try to export its version of democratic capitalism. It does mean that, for the early 21st century and perhaps longer, the prevailing political norms will be consonant with our own. Ideas once seen as peculiarly "Western" are now embraced by ordinary people the world over who see in them the best

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hope for lives of dignity, liberty, and opportunity.

Against this backdrop, conservative demands that the United States withdraw from its global responsibilities seem downright perverse. Why, when the tide is running strongly in our direction, should the United States turn its back on the world? An enlightened view of our national self-interest dictates the opposite: the conscious application of America's many strengths toward the goal of building a new international system on a durable foundation of democracy, human rights, and economic freedom.

Democratic Realism rejects the cold calculus of realpolitik, which breeds dangerous great power rivalries and ignores the crucial role that ideas, values, and social conflicts within nations have always played in relations among nations.

In addition to its geography and endowments, a nation's political beliefs, culture, and internal governing arrangements profoundly affect its conduct in the world. It is no accident that despotic regimes that run roughshod over human rights and the rule of law at home (Iraq is today's most extreme example) are more apt to engage in aggressive conduct abroad. By the same token, 20th-century history shows that democratic governments, constrained by public opinion, competing domestic interests, and accountable political institutions, are less likely to start wars and more inclined to cooperate with other countries and adhere to international agreements and norms. Both Argentina and Brazil, for example, abandoned nuclear weapons programs in the early 1990s as they successfully underwent transitions from military rule to democracy.

U.S. support for human rights and encouragement of internal political change in oppressed societies therefore is not merely an expression of U.S. idealism. It also serves our strategic interest in shaping an international environment more congenial to America's economic and security interests.

America: first among equals. The events of the last decade, from U.S.-led wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans to our rebounding economy and technological dynamism, have confirmed America's dominant position in world affairs. Rarely in history has one nation towered so far above the others — a reality easily accepted by most Americans, who are sure our intentions are benign, but an alarming sign to others, who see an emerging U.S. "hyperpower" with no effective check on its ambitions.

An overriding challenge for U.S. diplomacy in the decades ahead will be to prevent other powers from uniting against us. The best way to advance our interests without provoking anti-American coalitions is to work through thickening networks of alliances, international institutions, and rule-based regimes that promote global cooperation. It's time to drop breast-beating rhetoric about being the world's "sole superpower" and instead think of ourselves as "first among equals," willing to play by the same rules we hold others to. A small but symbolically important move in this direction would be to pay our U.N. arrears, a step that would give force to our valid demands for U.N. reform.

By fostering an international climate of mutual respect and common purposes, the United States can work to extend the reach of economic and political freedom without conjuring fears of American hegemony. We can also draw on the resources of allies and international organizations and win wider legitimacy for our cause — whether it is checking Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction, stopping ethnic violence in the Balkans, or tackling global warming.

Military strength and alliances still matter. A succession of small crises in the 1990s has yielded a clear lesson: While globalization knits together much of the democratic world, there are new and powerful tendencies toward disintegration and disorder that, if not checked, will spiral out of control. Chief among these are ethnic conflicts within, as well as across national boundaries; rogue states such as Iraq and Libya; and failed states such as North Korea, Cambodia, and Somalia, which are unable to provide basic services or prevent civil strife. International crime, drug dealing, terrorism, and regional rivalries, such as the long-running feud between India and Pakistan, also threaten international stability. ➔

"It's time to drop breast-beating rhetoric about being the world's 'sole superpower' and instead think of ourselves as 'first among equals,' willing to play by the same rules we hold others to."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Australia's decision to intervene in East Timor is a promising sign that regional powers are willing to shoulder the primary responsibility for ending violence in their backyard."

A strategy of Democratic Realism requires that we maintain America's commitment to uphold crucial balances of power in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The United States must invest the resources necessary to maintain qualitatively superior military forces with a global reach. Even more important than the level of spending, however, is the pace of defense modernization. The next administration should dramatically accelerate the transformation of our Cold War military into a more mobile, flexible, and integrated force organized around the new information technologies and operational concepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs. At the same time, we should press our allies to reduce their reliance on U.S. power and upgrade their own military forces so that they can assume more responsibility for keeping order.

Reinventing collective security. Just as America answered the challenges of the late 1940s with an array of innovative security institutions and alliances — of which NATO was by far the most important — we must envision a new collective security architecture for the post-Cold War world. Two key elements are modernizing NATO for new missions and building a decentralized system of regional security organizations.

1. Strengthen and extend the transatlantic core. The new correlation of political, economic, and military forces puts the transatlantic community at the center of the emerging global system. The United States and the 15 countries of the European Union together account for nearly half the world's wealth and about two-thirds of its trade and investment. NATO represents by far the world's largest concentration of military power, with combined annual defense spending of $449 billion, compared to Russia's $70 billion or China's $35 billion.

Our goal should be to extend the transatlantic community to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and eventually to Russia and other former Soviet states in Europe. By making market democracy the price of admission to the European Union and NATO, we already have given a powerful stimulus to economic and political reform in those countries.

In addition to backing the European Union's eastward expansion, the United States should encourage NATO's transformation from a strictly defensive alliance into an instrument for advancing common transatlantic interests and values in the region, such as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo.

NATO must evolve, not simply expand. Before rushing into a second round of enlargement, the United States should press for a serious assessment by NATO of the potential threats arising from Europe's southern and southeastern flanks. The experience of Balkan peacekeeping highlights the need for police forces trained to keep civil order rather than fight wars. The United States should also urge NATO to grapple with the most urgent threat facing the transatlantic partners today: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as long-range missiles and other means for delivering them.

Finally, the United States should welcome the push to develop a European security and defense identity within the framework of NATO. With the Cold War behind us, Europeans are less likely to accept a subordinate role to the United States in NATO, while Americans are more likely to question the need for continuing what amounts to a massive subsidy to Europe's defense. By carving out a space within NATO for our European partners to forge common foreign and security policies, as well as plans for upgrading Europe's military capacities, we can accommodate the interests of both sides in striking a new balance of political and military burdens.

2. Bolster regional security arrangements. In a multipolar world, regional arrangements — from NATO to a proposed West African Peace Force — become a new driving principle of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Since the United States cannot police the entire world, we should work to bolster the political and military capacities of regional security organizations. It will be less costly and often more effective for the United States to train and equip local peacekeeping forces than to send our own forces abroad. Australia's decision to intervene in East Timor is a promising sign that regional powers are willing to shoulder the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primary responsibility for ending violence in their backyard.

Proclaiming a new "right to intervene" in other countries' internal conflicts, some have called for organizing a United Nations army to do the job. But it would make more sense to encourage a dramatic devolution of power to regional bodies. For example, the Clinton administration has offered U.S. help in training a permanent African peacekeeping force through its African Crisis Response Initiative. We should view other regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of American States as building blocks for a decentralized collective security system, operating under the aegis of the United Nations and with the support of the major U.N. donors. Such a system would encourage and support action by countries with the greatest incentive to quell local conflicts while defusing fears that the United States or other advanced democracies are plotting to usher in a new era of "human rights imperialism."

Democratic Realism seeks a new balance of American ideals and interests. It builds on the time-honored principles of liberal internationalism: At the core of the post-Cold War world is a growing zone of democracies committed to relatively open markets and free trade, political relations based on agreed-upon rules and norms of behavior, and institutions to cooperatively manage and enforce those standards. Protecting and extending that democratic community serves our security and economic interests while also expressing Americans' ingrained belief in our country's historic mission. Deftly executed, policies based on Democratic Realism can not only underpin America's vital interests and continued global success, but help ensure a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world. ■

A MULTIPOLAR WORLD requires regional peacekeeping initiatives. Malian members of the African Crisis Response Initiative stand for review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humanitarian intervention is driven by wrenching images and mass killing. But it must be politically viable. Here's a three-part test.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR: The violence passed all tests for humanitarian intervention. United Nations troops patrol the streets of Dili, the capital.

When to go in

by Stephen J. Solarz

SENDING U.S. FORCES INTO COMBAT ABROAD is one of the most significant decisions an American president can face. Ever since Jefferson dispatched ships to Tripoli to quell the Barbary pirates, presidents have used American might overseas to advance what are perceived as the country's vital security or economic interests. Increasingly, however, presidents are confronted with another kind of decision: whether to intervene overseas for essentially humanitarian purposes.

The recent bloodletting in East Timor, the ethnic cleansing and massacres in Bosnia and Kosovo, and tribal horrors in Africa have forced the difficult choice of whether to stand aside while slaughter, displacement, and politically driven starvation occurred or to use our military strength, in concert with other countries, to cross sovereign borders and stop the killing.

Intervening where vital U.S. interests are threatened is not a hard choice. When the security of the country, the safety of American citizens, the credibility of our commitments, or the integrity of our economic lifelines are involved, the use of American military power can easily be justified — multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary. This is particularly the case when it is clear that other options, such as economic sanctions, are not likely to work. ➔

Stephen J. Solarz is vice chair of the International Crisis Group and a former Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PICTURES THAT CHANGE POLICY: A Serbian shell kills 37 in a Bosnian market, triggering NATO intervention.

But what about situations like those in Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994? Significant national interests were not at stake, but the survival of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children clearly depended on the willingness of the United States and other countries to intervene militarily. In one case (Somalia), we did, and our humanitarian objective was achieved; in the other (Rwanda), we didn't, and we became indifferent spectators to one of the great humanitarian catastrophes of our time.

As we end the bloodiest century in the human experience, which gave the world the term genocide, there is no more compelling moral imperative than preventing such systematic slaughters in the future. Our physical security or economic well-being may not be directly affected by the wholesale killing of people in countries with no apparent economic or strategic significance to us. But in an age of instant communication, when news of mass murder and starvation is brought into our homes in real time, we cannot afford to be indifferent to the fate of fellow human beings in faraway places. To ignore massive brutality and killing would be to accept the law of the jungle, rather than the rule of law, as the governing principle of the international community.

"As we end the bloodiest century in the human experience, there is no more compelling moral imperative than preventing such systematic slaughters in the future."

Some, of course, will object to humanitarian intervention as a violation of the principle of sovereignty, which precludes military interference in the internal affairs of other nations. This argument has been taken up with renewed vigor in the wake of Kosovo by China and Russia; they fear that the international community might use the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention to limit their ability to deal as they wish with troublesome provinces, such as Tibet, Taiwan, Chechnya, and Dagestan.

Yet it is clear today that the non-interference doctrine no longer trumps all other considerations. This was obvious when the United Nations sanctioned interventions during the 1990s in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Where crimes against humanity or genocide are involved, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is increasingly accepted as a justification for violating the otherwise inviolable borders of sovereign states.

This does not mean, of course, that the United States can involve itself in every human rights violation in the world. Ensnared in the ethnic turmoil of developing countries and failed states, so the argument goes, we would inevitably diminish our capacity to deal with the more serious threats to our genuine national interests. We cannot and should not become the policeman for the planet. Were we to accept such an obligation — for which there is neither domestic support nor an international demand — we would soon find ourselves stretched hopelessly thin, squandering our limited national resources, and generating increasing foreign resentment.

But the fact that we cannot intervene everywhere doesn't mean we should intervene nowhere. The challenge is to devise a conceptual framework for humanitarian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intervention that will enable us to determine where intervention is appropriate and where it is not. We must avoid the slippery slope that would lead to the kind of perpetual involvements the American people are rightly determined to avoid.

One of the first questions any president faces when considering intervention — humanitarian or otherwise — is whether the American people are prepared to accept casualties, however minimal.

The deaths of 18 Rangers in a firefight in Mogadishu in 1993 unleashed a storm of criticism that had a debilitating effect on the administration's inclination to commit American forces to other humanitarian interventions. Yet a willingness to accept some casualties is the price of a politically sustainable humanitarian intervention. Our experience in Kosovo notwithstanding, immaculate interventions in which there are literally no American casualties are likely to be the exception rather than the rule.

If the objective is compelling and the risks are made clear, our national leadership should be politically skilled enough to secure the support of the American people for military action. This is where presidential leadership makes a difference. Public opinion polls suggest that, where genocide or massive ethnic cleansing are involved, the American people are prepared to accept prudent risks to stop them. But it is up to the president to harness that commendable disposition to the cause of humanitarian intervention.

Another argument is that unless we have an exit strategy for withdrawing our forces by a certain time, we should not undertake a military intervention, no matter how great the humanitarian justification. It is clearly desirable to establish the criteria for ending a military operation before commencing it. But it would be a mistake to make this an absolute prerequisite before intervening to prevent a genocide.

If the price of preventing genocide or the massive loss of innocent lives includes the indefinite overseas deployment of a peacekeeping force, it is a price worth paying — until indigenous security arrangements or a political settlement that deals with the causes of the conflict can be achieved. In several cases since World War II, after all, the long-term stationing of U.S. or U.N. forces has served us well. This has certainly been true in Europe and Asia, where American troops have been stationed for half a century; even with the end of the Cold War, they are needed. And more than 25 years after U.N. forces were sent to Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Golan Heights, they are still helping to preserve a peace that might quickly degenerate into war were they to be withdrawn.

Having considered and rejected the arguments against humanitarian intervention in general, we still have to determine which interventions to support in particular. The following three criteria provide guidelines for deciding when humanitarian intervention is justified in ethnic conflicts and other cases of internal repression. ➔

PICTURES THAT DON'T: Russian rockets kill 150 in a Chechen market. No one intervenes.

"To ignore massive brutality and killing would be to accept the law of the jungle, rather than the rule of law, as the governing principle of the international community."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We should be prepared to intervene on humanitarian grounds when:

1. The actual or anticipated loss of life substantially exceeds the lives lost to violence in the United States. The rationale for this criterion is that we have no moral obligation to make other countries safer than our own. But if, because of a deliberate policy of genocide or ethnic cleansing, the number of those at risk can be numbered in the tens of thousands or more, we should be prepared to consider military intervention to bring the killing to an end.

2. The military operation to stop the massive loss of life would not put at risk anything close to the number of lives it would save. The justification is prudential: If the purpose of the intervention is to save lives, it cannot be justified if the fighting to end the conflict would be more deadly than letting events take their course.

3. The United States is able to secure the participation of other countries in the military intervention. The reason is essentially political: Neither the Congress nor the American people would be prepared to put the lives of American servicemen and -women at risk if other countries, particularly those in the region where the crisis exists, are not willing to do so as well.

If all these conditions can be met, we should be prepared to move militarily, in concert with other countries, to thwart those who would engage in genocide or massive ethnic cleansing. Where these criteria cannot be met, diplomatic protests and/or economic sanctions will have to suffice.

There will undoubtedly be situations in the future, as there have been in the past, where other countries acting on their own (and not always from humanitarian considerations) move to bring down murderous regimes, as did Tanzania with Uganda, India with East Pakistan, and Vietnam with Cambodia, all in the 1970s. In such situations, there is no moral or political need for us to insist on joining the intervention. But these situations are likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Most of the time, if the world's only superpower is not prepared to act, it is doubtful that others will instead.

Where a multinational intervention is necessary, it will almost always be desirable to have the imprimatur of a Security Council resolution. That will greatly help persuade not just other countries but also the American people to support such an intervention.

But given the increasingly neuralgic reaction of Russia and China to military action on the territory of sovereign states, it would be a mistake to insist on U.N. endorsement for all humanitarian interventions. To permit nations as indifferent to human rights as Russia and China to veto multinational intervention in cases of slaughter and displacement would be morally unjustified and politically unwise. It would mean acquiescing in the otherwise preventable deaths of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of innocent human beings and would itself become a new source of global instability.

So where does this leave us? How would this formula have worked in the humanitarian crises of the last decade? It seems fair to say that Somalia, where we did act, and Rwanda, where we didn't, both meet the test of justifiable intervention. In Rwanda, the refusal of the international community to take steps to stop the genocide, precisely because it could have been halted at a minimum cost in blood and treasure, was our greatest moral failure of the last half-century. In Somalia, our original objective of dispatching a peacekeeping force to help deliver food to starving civilians was sound; our mistake lay in expanding the mission to a vain and counterproductive effort to capture a recalcitrant warlord.

"In Rwanda, the refusal of the international community to take steps to stop the genocide, precisely because it could have been halted at a minimum cost in blood and treasure, was our greatest moral failure of the last half-century."

Bosnia and Kosovo, which would appear to meet the conditions for a humanitarian intervention, can also be justified on other grounds: the credibility of American commitments, the viability of NATO, and the potentially destabilizing consequences for southeastern Europe of a successful Serbian effort to ethnically cleanse Muslim populations from these parts of the former Yugoslavia.

The conflict in Chechnya, on the other hand, does not meet the criteria for a humanitarian intervention, despite the enormous loss of life caused by the brutal Russian assault against this rebellious province. The reason is simple. The potential consequences of a larger

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MISERY CALLS: Intervention is called for when the human suffering is unbearable, and the job is doable. These East Timorese gathered at a compound awaiting human-rights monitors.

conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia if we tried to intervene in Chechnya are too horrible to contemplate; there would have been no support either abroad or at home for such an endeavor. While Cambodia in the mid-1970s would have qualified for a humanitarian response considering the number of civilians killed by the Khmer Rouge, it would not have been possible in the wake of the wars in Indo-China to have mustered either the domestic political will or the multinational backing necessary. Similarly, had Indonesia not yielded to international pressure to accept a U.N. peacekeeping force in East Timor, it is highly unlikely that any of the countries that joined the force would have been willing to participate in such a mission.

Most of the other conflicts that raged during the 1990s, some of which are still under way, failed to meet the three-part test for humanitarian intervention. In almost every case, the extent of the killing (however deplorable) did not reach unacceptable levels; an intervention would have put more lives in jeopardy than could conceivably have been saved; or it would have been impossible to create the multinational coalition that is a political prerequisite for such endeavors.

There is nothing we can do to bring back from the dead those who lost their lives in the concentration camps of Nazi-occupied Europe, the killing fields of Cambodia, the cities and countryside of Rwanda, and the many other places whose names have earned their place in the long history of man's inhumanity to man. But we can give their suffering and sacrifice a redeeming significance if we resolve as a nation that, whenever and wherever possible, we will do everything we can, in concert with other nations, to make sure that those intent on genocide or ethnic cleansing will never again have a free hand to carry out their wicked work. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROLIFERATION SOARS: India and Pakistan menace each other with tests of nuclear devices and threats to deliver them on missiles like this model of an Indian Prithvi, on parade in Bombay.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Defusing today's doomsday machines

by Michael Krepon

In June 1998, India stunned the world with a series of nuclear tests, provoking a tit-for-tat response from Pakistan two weeks later. The blasts were a wake-up call to a world lulled into complacency by the landmark U.S.-Russian arms reduction agreements of the early 1990s.

The post-Cold War momentum toward nuclear disarmament has stalled, giving way to a new era of nuclear dangers.

These range from Russia's lax control over its missiles and nuclear stockpiles, to secret transfers of missile technology to Iraq and Iran, to North Korea's on-again, off-again quest for nuclear weapons. We now live in a world where a clever thief — or an unprincipled government — could put nuclear materials into the hands of a rogue nation or a messianic ideologue with deep pockets.

In short, the main danger we face today is not a thermonuclear exchange by the superpowers, but the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, along with the means for delivering them to our shores. Yet we are still living under a Cold War framework of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit threat of "mutual assured destruction." This formula, defined by huge nuclear arsenals in a high state of launch readiness — and no effective defense against missile attacks — no longer makes sense.

It is time for a fundamental rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in America's defense strategy. The rise of proliferation to the top of the nation's 21st-century security agenda dictates a new strategic synthesis consisting of three elements: deep cuts in offensive nuclear forces; much-reduced launch readiness; and limited missile defense.

Missile defenses are designed to shoot down missiles launched against us. Building such defenses would be a dramatic break with Cold War policy and must be negotiated with the Russians. Both the United States and Russia remain bound by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM), which severely limits the number of defensive missiles they can deploy and the number of sites they can protect.

Revising our strategy to an approach of deep cuts plus missile defenses would reduce the likelihood of an unintentional or unauthorized nuclear strike, nuclear mishap, or theft of nuclear materials. It would also provide some insurance against missile attacks from rogue states or other bad actors and strengthen global constraints on the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Specifically, the next administration should work with Russia to:

1. *Cut our offensive nuclear arsenals from 3,500 to 1,000 warheads.*
2. *Reduce the number of missiles on high states of alert.*
3. *Agree to build and share a limited missile-defense system.*

The "deep cuts plus missile defenses" formula poses a direct challenge to the Cold War ➔

"We now live in a world where a clever thief — or an unprincipled government — could put nuclear materials into the hands of a rogue nation or a messianic ideologue with deep pockets."

Michael Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thinking that still dominates discussion of nuclear issues. Many liberal arms controllers oppose missile defenses on the grounds that they don't work and that, if they did, they would likely lead other countries to build even more offensive weapons. Conservative backers of missile defenses, meanwhile, are skeptical of arms reduction accords and multilateral efforts to discourage other countries from developing weapons of mass destruction. Unless the next administration can break this deadlock with a new approach, the United States could face the worst of all worlds: a new global nuclear arms race and no defense against missile attacks.

This new synthesis will, of course, require especially close cooperation with Moscow based on a high degree of trust. After all, the transition from many thousands of weapons on hair-trigger alert — and no anti-missile defenses — to a much smaller, "holstered" arsenal of nuclear arms, accompanied by new missile defenses, will take years and require detailed negotiation and verification.

"Why should the U.S. cooperate with a weakened Russia at a time of unparalled American strength? Because a Russia in distress with a surfeit of nuclear weapons and fissile material spells trouble for the United States, our allies, Russia's neighbors, and for non-proliferation treaties."

But why should the United States cooperate with a weakened Russia at a time of unparalled American strength? Because a Russia in distress with a surfeit of nuclear weapons and fissile material spells trouble for the United States, our allies, Russia's neighbors, and for non-proliferation treaties. In fact, there is no better time to act boldly and creatively than when Russia and its nuclear forces face an uncertain future and when U.S. conventional (non-nuclear) military strength is unchallenged.

This is especially true in view of how badly the treaty-based foundations of our current arms control system are crumbling. With the START II treaty still hung up in the Russian Duma, the momentum of superpower collaboration on nuclear arms reduction has faltered. This could endanger one of the bulwarks against the spread of nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation treaty. It explicitly links commitments by "have-not" nations not to acquire nuclear weapons with the willingness of the "haves" to reduce their stockpiles.

The first order of business is resuming progress toward deep cuts in nuclear arms. While the START II treaty permits each side 3,500 deployed warheads, Russia, with its staggering economy and aging missile forces, now wants to lower the limit to 1,500 or fewer. The United States should seize the opportunity to offer to go down to 1,000 warheads. Taking 2,500 warheads off hair-trigger alert would represent a huge reduction in danger and still leave each side with a strong deterrent force. These weapons could remain in high states of launch readiness until they could be "holstered" — put on a negotiated and mutual de-alert that requires days, not minutes, to make them launch-ready. The ways and means of lengthening the nuclear fuse and holstering nuclear forces will be difficult to negotiate. But we should break the impasse by at least beginning discussions.

In return for carrying out parallel and verifiable reductions with Russia, the United States could reasonably demand quite a bit from the Kremlin, including revisions of the ABM treaty. The United States should also press for extending the cooperative threat-reduction programs to include the irreversible dismantling of nuclear warheads for tactical as well as strategic forces.

It is essential for U.S. leaders to keep missile defenses in perspective. They are not the silver bullet that some conservatives would have us believe, and we should not ask taxpayers to write a blank check for an ambitious program based on fanciful notions of comprehensive security.

For the foreseeable future, only limited missions for missile defenses will be achievable. For example, we may have to confront countries with small missile forces that could put U.S. forward-deployed forces, U.S. allies and friends, and even U.S. cities at risk. In addition, a limited, unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles from Russian soil cannot be excluded.

A modest insurance policy against missile threats is worth buying, and it would require only minor changes to the ABM treaty. However, buying too much insurance — by deploying heavy defenses to counter light threats — would not be a wise use of taxpayer dollars and would likely kill prospects for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

further cooperation with Russia to reduce nuclear threats.

The politics of creating the new nuclear synthesis are complicated, given tensions within the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma and between the parliamentarians on both sides and their respective presidencies. But options exist: New negotiations could be initiated while leap-frogging the stalled START II accord with a more ambitious treaty. Or arms control officials on each side could reach back to the intrusive verification arrangements of START I (ratified by both countries) to ensure parallel, reciprocal reductions.

In this scenario, U.S. and Russian leaders could pursue cuts through a combination of verifiable treaty constraints and executive agreements to reduce nuclear threats. The two governments could reduce launch readiness for nuclear forces and dismantle nuclear warheads without having to negotiate new treaties.

Formal agreements would be better, but achieving them would depend greatly on improved executive-legislative relations in both Russia and the United States. Convincing the requisite number of U.S. senators and Duma members to consent to a package deal involving deep cuts and revisions of the ABM treaty would be challenging, to say the least. In any case, legislators would still be able to wield the power of the purse by, for example, refusing to pay for further cuts in nuclear forces or for preparations to deploy missile defenses.

The debate over arms control vs. missile defense made sense during the Cold War, but it has now been overtaken by events. Both arms control advocates and strategic defense enthusiasts want to reduce nuclear dangers, but they are too wedded to old positions to try to reconcile their differences in the light of new circumstances. The American people, however, favor both deep cuts in nuclear arms and missile defense. Both objectives can be compatible and stabilizing as long as they are pursued cooperatively with Russia and, eventually, other nuclear powers. The next administration faces the challenge of turning common sense into national policy. ■



HITTING A BULLET WITH A BULLET: Do we need missile defenses? This time exposure shows a Theater High-Altitude Area Defense missile striking another missile in June 1999 at New Mexico's White Sands Missile Range.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Revolutionizing warfare

by Admiral William A. Owens

COMMENTING LAST SUMMER on NATO's attacks against Serbia during the Kosovo war, the Supreme Commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, said, "We won the information war. We had a tremendous digital backbone."

Gen. Clark's remark captured the essence of today's revolution in military affairs. Driven both by military needs and galloping innovations in the new economy, the United States has developed "information superiority," which has enabled us to throw an effective "information umbrella" over our own forces and those of our friends and allies. In Kosovo, this dominant battlefield knowledge gave us an operational superiority that went beyond our obvious strength in arms and technology. It meant a quicker, smarter use of those advantages than the world has ever known.

At century's end, we have the opportunity to vastly improve the U.S. military, making it both affordable and better suited for today's crises. But if we are to lead this historic transformation rather than be swept along by it, we must complete the revolution in military affairs on which we embarked two decades ago.

Revolutionizing our military involves more than accepting new technology. It requires integrating the technology into military organization and doctrine. That's what made other turning points ➔

Admiral William A. Owens is a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Clinton Administration.

INFORMATION TRIUMPHANT: NATO's information superiority, as much as its bombs, won the Kosovo war. Air Force personnel train for duty in AWACS flight control aircraft over the Persian Gulf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kosovo showed that information technology is the cutting edge of today's war. Here's how to create the fast-moving, high-tech military of the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in military history so significant. Hitler's blitzkrieg, the British air defense of England, the introduction of aircraft carriers for force projection, and the advent of nuclear weapons were revolutionary because they tied new technology to new ways of using it. Each of these revolutions was driven by a willingness to experiment with new doctrine and force structures. And in each, standing military forces were encouraged to work out new ways of doing things and given the resources and freedom to do so.

For at least a decade, talk of an impending revolution in military affairs has been on everyone's lips. But action has not matched our rhetoric. Between Desert Storm in 1991 and the conflict with Serbia in 1999, we meandered hesitantly down an evolutionary path toward military modernization. Blessed with the world's most potent and effective military force, we preferred to preserve from the past rather than build for the future. We focused largely on building slightly improved versions of the tanks, aircraft, and ships that had served us so well during the Cold War, rather than on improving the interaction among our ground, maritime, and aerospace forces. And we clung to doctrine and structure honed for a worldwide war with another military superpower, rather than providing for the agility and innovation we needed to deal quickly and efficiently with the challenges we faced in Rwanda, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, and Serbia.

Now we should change that course. We should accelerate our leap into new technologies, new force structures, and new planning-and-command mechanisms that will yield a military suited for 21st-century challenges.

"The revolution in military affairs is a shift from mass to mobility, from attrition warfare to agility, from overwhelming firepower to smart firepower."

First, we must strengthen and complete our information umbrella. Already in Desert Storm, our military had taken great leaps forward in information processing and tactical translation of information into action. Using air- and space-based imagery, the U.S.-led coalition could respond quickly to Iraqi armored movements, mining operations, and mobile rocket sites. Information that once took weeks or days to gather, evaluate, and implement now took only hours. But by the time U.S. fighter-bombers began striking Serbian targets in 1999, our ability to use information — to cope with what the military calls the "sensor-to-shooter" lag — had been reduced from hours to minutes. Imagery from unmanned Predator aerial vehicles, often operating beneath the cloud cover over Kosovo, let decision-makers in Washington and Brussels see battlefield action as it unfolded, in real time. But more important, that imagery also flowed into the cockpits of our aircraft on station far above the clouds, allowing the pilots to distinguish Serb military vehicles from the civilian trucks and cars among which they sought to hide. After the conflict ended, Predators and other unmanned aerial vehicles continued to extend and expand the real-time awareness of the peacekeeping troops in Kosovo.

The revolution goes beyond the obvious military advantage we gain from it. It also includes potential foreign policy leverage from offering to share dominant battlefield knowledge with our friends and allies. Like us, our allies face an ambiguous world. The need to cut through ambiguity, especially at operational and tactical levels, has replaced the need to offset the prowess of a superior adversary posing an unambiguous threat. Sharing dominant battle-space knowledge — the key to modern deterrence — will reassure our friends and allies.

During the Cold War, "extended nuclear deterrence" was the keystone of our alliances and our security. By sheltering under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, countries such as Germany and Japan were able to escape the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack or intimidation without having to develop their own nuclear arsenals — a move that would have been deeply destabilizing. Today, as the utility of the old nuclear umbrella fades, the United States can offer extended deterrence by opening its new information umbrella to our friends. But in this case, our allies can help build and sustain the deterrent — information dominance — without posing a threat to anyone else.

The other key technological element in the revolution in military affairs is a shift from mass to mobility, from attrition warfare to agility, from overwhelming firepower to smart firepower. We have made great strides in these areas. That was apparent to anyone

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



EYES IN THE SKY: The unmanned Predator aerial vehicle provided real-time intelligence during the Kosovo war to generals in Brussels and Washington and to pilots flying above the cloud cover.

who watched the evening news as precision-guided munitions took out pinpoint targets in Serbia. That we still have a long way to go was equally apparent when we found that our huge Cold War tanks couldn't navigate some of the narrow mountain roads and tight village streets in Kosovo, forcing us to fall back on Humvees and other lightly armed vehicles. Quick and agile we were not.

To carry forward the military information revolution and the shift to lighter and more effective (rather than more overwhelming) weaponry, we must make key structural changes. First, we must overcome the bureaucratic and political inertia that has left America with a military force best described as "Cold War minus." Second, we must address and finally slay that old bugaboo of military efficiency and effectiveness, interservice rivalry.

Since the Soviet Union unraveled a decade ago, U.S. civilian and military leaders have engaged in successive efforts to rethink our military doctrines and force structure, from Gen. Colin Powell's "base force concept" to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel, first proposed in a report by the Progressive Policy Institute. Yet after all these attempts to gauge threats and shape our forces accordingly, the United States has a military force that looks much like the one it had in 1985, though somewhat smaller.

Pentagon planners remain wedded to the old Industrial Age priorities of mass and numbers, and political leaders have been reluctant to second-guess the uniformed experts. In the meantime, however, the United States has engaged in a series of military operations, from Somalia to the Balkans, that called for more agile, expeditionary and quickly decisive forces. The next administration must take on the politically difficult but essential task of trading Cold War mass for military modernization. Even in an era of surplus, we will not be able to sustain the force we have and speed the pace of experimentation with the new technologies and operational concepts of the revolution in military affairs. We must choose, and the choices will be wrenching.

In addition to the military's innate conservatism, another impediment to change is the deeply rooted culture of service rivalry. Years after the first calls (and legislation) for increased joint operations among the services, our military forces still suffer from too much compartmentalization and redundancy. This is especially true in support operations and force enhancers such as intelligence, logistics, medical operations, and communications. Each service still wants — and has — its own intelligence officers, quartermasters, doctors, and radio operators. As before, this parochialism is driven not by military requirements but by the bureaucratic ➔

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperative to maintain one's relative institutional status.

This rivalry is not merely redundant and therefore costly. It can also undercut our ability to integrate new information technology into planning and operations. With traditional service commitments to the planes, tanks, and ships that once defined our military prowess — and each service branch's own war specialty — we are inserting the new technology in uncoordinated and competing ways into our standing force structures.

To overcome these obstacles to the overdue modernization of our military, we need to do four things:

First, we should expand dramatically our joint experimentation efforts. We could use significant force elements of each service — perhaps as much as one Army division, one Air Force wing, and one Navy carrier battle group — as a dedicated joint experimental base. This military contingent, which we might call the Vanguard Force, would operate jointly, under a joint command, with a separate funding stream from Congress. It would have the mission of integrating the advances in information technology into new structures and operational doctrine designed to take fullest advantage of the leverage from the new information technology. By mandating such a Vanguard Force, Congress could at a stroke achieve what no amount of hearings and legislation has accomplished in 25 years: eliminating service rivalries.

"We could use significant force elements of each service — perhaps as much as one Army division, one Air Force wing, and one Navy carrier battle group — as a dedicated Vanguard Force."

For operational purposes, the Vanguard Force should be under the United States Joint Forces Command, given at least a three-year life span, and funded at about $8 billion for its experimental undertakings. The Force's tasks would include implementation of advanced information technology, new joint operational concepts, and cross-force synchronization. All support elements would be joint and non-redundant. The Force would be freed of everyday readiness requirements to experiment with the new technologies in joint operations.

Second, we must change our operational command structure. This should be done at the three-star level (lieutenant general, vice admiral). This is where true operational command resides and where the synergy of joint operations and new information technology can unfold.

Third, we should consolidate the four great combat enablers: intelligence, communications, logistics, and medical services. These important functions are currently conducted independently by each of the military services, leading to inefficient redundancies and reducing the advantages we gain from advances in information technology.

Fourth, we need to address another creeping corruption of our decision-making system, the gradual erosion of civilian control. Force planning — for personnel, unit size, equipment, and weaponry — has been left increasingly in the hands of the uniformed military, with predictably parochial results. This should be changed by creating a Joint Requirements Committee chaired by the Secretary of Defense. With the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior military member, this committee would identify the necessary force structure, personnel levels, and all major military systems across all the military services. A combined military-civilian staff should support the committee, replacing the individual service staffs. The chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should become the chief executive officers of service infrastructure, with the task of manning, training, and managing service facilities to meet the requirements set by the Joint Requirements Committee.

By changing its focus, goals, structure, and planning, the U.S. military can position itself to meet the assorted and rapidly changing threats of the coming century. With information technology as the driving engine, the Vanguard Force as the testing vehicle, and a Joint Requirements Committee as an implementing arm, we can transform our military from a cumbersome 20th-century behemoth to a lean, brainy, yet fearsome 21st-century strike force. How well and how soon we do this depends on the smart decisions we make today. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The New Democrat Movement is just one click away.

The best source for New Democrat ideas, policy, news, speeches, leaders and happenings.

http://www.dlcppi.org

Democratic Leadership Council / Progressive Policy Institute.

ideas. leaders. the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LOOKING FOR A GOOD FIGHTING VEHICLE: In 1940 (top right) the German Panzer overwhelmed France's Maginot Line with its speed and agility. The heavy American M-1 Abrams tank (above) played a key role in the Gulf War victory. But yesterday's winner may be an albatross in the next conflict.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Buying smart

We can't modernize by budgeting for Cold War Lite. Why today's spending choices will determine tomorrow's readiness.

by Keith B. Bickel

Ten years after the Cold War's end, the United States military has settled on what could be called Cold War Lite. We have a fighting machine that, while somewhat slimmed down, is still trained, equipped, and structured to fight a peer enemy (Russia) in a bipolar world under wide-open geographic conditions, like the plains of central Europe or the deserts of the Middle East.

Yet these are the least likely war scenarios we face today. We are not likely to find another enemy as obliging as Iraq was to fight us using Soviet military doctrine and technology under the ideal conditions of the Persian Gulf deserts. After all, Desert Storm was the son of all Cold War battles — the Fulda Gap moved to the Euphrates delta. Instead, the world today is in the midst of dramatic changes that will lead us not just to more small-scale humanitarian interventions, but to "high-end" warfare characterized by lighter, faster, stealthier weaponry.

In 1940, a similar dramatic shift occurred. France thought it had the right defense for the right time and place in its Maginot Line. Perfectly positioned for static trench warfare, France was taken by surprise when Hitler introduced what the military calls an asymmetric counter, or unexpected response: the Blitzkrieg. Fast-moving German Panzers and Stuka dive-bombers transformed warfare and vanquished France in six weeks. The cost of being unprepared for an unforeseen use of new technology was devastating.

At century's end, the United States likewise faces a dramatically shifting threat paradigm which raises major questions in military planning: Will we continue to write budgets that tinker at the margins of old ones, or will we fundamentally rethink how we spend today's money for tomorrow's warfare? If we don't make the latter choice, we could see ourselves falling behind the curve of modern warfare and — worst case — even losing our superpower status with its global reach and credibility.

Two forces in the military planning community and in Congress are currently in conflict over which choice to make. One force is driven by the traditionalists who continue to invest in what is essentially an upgraded, modernized version of a Cold War military. This static approach is partially a product of service rivalries — each general and admiral wants an arsenal as good and big as his peers'. The debate is also mired in classic political maneuvering: Members of Congress defend the existing interests, and the defense contracts, of their constituents. The political inertia reinforces the military inertia.

Against this way of thinking, a second force consists of the defense modernizers who favor "leap-ahead" technologies and see a different kind of warfare in America's future. This school of military thought no longer considers massed forces and overwhelming firepower as the key indices of future military superiority. It recognizes that proliferation of missile technology and advances in commercial surveillance and communications will soon allow our adversaries, even the poorer ones, to level ➔

Keith B. Bickel is a senior defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the playing field against us. The Pentagon's Defense Science Board has concluded that even nations with austere, Third-World budgets can create a formidable missile force. With off-the-shelf satellite imagery available for commercial downloading, they will be able to see what we see and strike from long distances with precision weaponry — without investing in the heavy armored forces, air fleets or carrier navies that only great powers can afford. These future competitors need not own expensive platforms and the associated infrastructure to frustrate U.S. war aims and deny us the ability to aid allies. They just need to invest in technologies that exploit our weaknesses. Think Milosevic with missiles.

This raises profound questions about weapons procurement and how we shape our defense budgets for the coming century. The answers are not obvious even to the modernizers, since it is not simply a matter of tilting the funding away from heavy armor toward high tech. Indeed, the answer lies not in selecting this or that piece of hardware or even software. It lies not in one weapons platform or another — not even in one doctrine or another. It lies instead in accepting uncertainty.

The salient feature of the Cold War was certainty; we lived in a bipolar world with a clear set of threats: land warfare in Europe, nuclear attack by intercontinental missiles, a possible invasion of Korea or Taiwan. Today the type of warfare we face is already changed; Kosovo, East Timor, or Rwanda may preoccupy us more than Russia or China. Tomorrow it will change even more. But the fact is that we do not know exactly what it will look like; our potential adversaries can be countries (North Korea) or terrorists (Hamas) or an eccentric billionaire with a messianic mission (Osama bin Laden). In short, we live in uncertainty.

To hedge against uncertainty, we must invest in multiple research and development (R&D) streams that ensure success on some fronts despite failures in others and that give us the flexibility to deal with constantly shifting military asymmetries. We must go down many research roads at once. And we must be willing to pay the price by reversing the continued decline in our R&D budgets, which have slid below 12 percent of military spending. Instead, these budgets should be increased by 50 percent or more.

Beyond giving ourselves a range of choices at the end of a typical 10- to 20-year R&D cycle, investing in a variety of military options will keep our adversaries off balance. They will be unable to foresee, as they so easily can today, the architecture of our strengths (e.g., stealthy aircraft, tank-on-tank warfare) and weaknesses (e.g., our inability to insert armored ground forces overseas rapidly). By keeping our planning trends open-ended across a broad front, we will force them likewise to make choices, not knowing where we will end up when it comes time to buy and deploy the fruits of our R&D. This is the dynamic approach necessary to military superiority in the 21st century.

A key advantage of this dynamic of uncertainty is that it helps us avoid three R&D pitfalls: lock-in, false starts, and "silver bullets."

- Lock-in is the error of having tied one's future too tightly to a single technology or weapons system that suddenly becomes obsolete — unexpectedly overtaken by another breakthrough. All one's eggs are then in the wrong basket.
- False starts are research paths that don't pan out. Thus the importance of simultaneously pursuing multiple options, with the necessary budget support, in the full understanding that some programs will hit dead ends.
- The "silver bullet" approach is expecting too much from a single big idea — such as missile defenses. Today's revival of the national missile defense program runs the risk of seeming to congressional budgetmakers like a silver bullet, or panacea, for the future. Worse, concentrating too big a share of the R&D budget on missile defense could generate a fourth pitfall — allowing one segment to hog all the money, thus limiting the dynamism and variety of our research program.

Promoting dynamic uncertainty is an asymmetric counter to the weaker players' strategy of neutralizing our strength with their own novel strategies. Choosing the other path —

"The answer lies not in selecting this or that piece of hardware or even software. It lies not in one weapons platform or another — not even in one doctrine or another. It lies instead in accepting uncertainty."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued procurement of weapons designed for an outdated strategic reality — deprives us of this dynamism and creates the risk that currently envisioned weapons will not survive in future battle environments. Rather than creating bigger and better successor weapons to our existing arsenal, we should be doing research "out of the box." The new weapons for a new threat will probably tend toward lean and swift rather than slow and mighty. Instead of another 70-ton M-1 Abrams tank that is unable to move through the narrow streets of Kosovo villages, planners should be looking at a 20-ton, high-speed, stealthy tank with long-range strike capabilities. Instead of a new, large, manned bomber, we should develop more small, unmanned bombers with sophisticated digital targeting systems.



COMING SOON TO A WEB SITE NEAR YOU: Once super-secret, satellite images like these pictures of B-52s parked near Tucson, Arizona, can now be downloaded by anyone.

Dynamic uncertainty requires a dramatic increase in the role of software, satellite communications, and real-time reconnaissance. This will mean that military R&D will increasingly dovetail with commercial research for civilian applications. Already Microsoft, whose products are as ubiquitous as ballpoint pens in everyday life, is a major defense contractor.

Businesses understand the dynamic of innovation in the fluid environment of the marketplace. Changing opportunities and emerging threats force them to hedge their risks — known and unknown — by investing in new capabilities. Unlike the military, however, businesses can adapt in at least three ways. One is to boost internal R&D spending to create new technologies or products, some of which will prove useful while others will remain on the shelf. The famed AT&T and IBM laboratories are examples of this approach. Another way is to buy other companies that have conducted the R&D already, so that the firm can focus on integrating the results into its own product lines. Major pharmaceutical companies engage in this behavior when they take over start-up bio-tech firms that successfully patent a new drug but don't have the resources to bring it to market. Finally, firms can buy new capabilities outright, which usually means buying other companies that have the new capabilities — product and marketing — fully developed. Microsoft did this when it bought the company that created Hotmail, the now-famous free Internet-based e-mail program.

The Defense Department can effectively mimic only the first of these options, in the hope that its R&D will produce the right capabilities. But without hedging, that is a high-risk strategy. It tells potential challengers how not to shape their new forces and how not to operate them. So the hedge becomes boosting military R&D accounts. Whatever the size of the defense pie, the R&D slice needs to be bigger. This means reversing the decline of the budget from $37 billion in 1995 to $31 billion in 2005.

As we make decisions for the 21st century, we must not allow ourselves to drift into the same position of vulnerability as France in 1940, which failed to foresee and adapt to profound changes in the nature, style, and tools of warfare. Preparing for an uncertain world 10 or 20 years hence means beginning the research and development today. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Get ready for cyberwar

by Sam Nunn

The Senate's former defense expert shows that weapons of *mass disruption* may endanger us as much as weapons of *mass destruction.*

When the Pentagon announced the opening of its new cyberwarfare center in Colorado in October 1999, the news was welcome to anyone who has followed the growing threat of cyberterrorism. The possibility of cyberattack on the United States has loomed on the horizon, and even right at our front door, for years. As the world's most technologically advanced nation, we are also its most technologically vulnerable. While we rightly focus on the growing threat from weapons of *mass destruction,* we must devote equal energy and attention to the threat from what are now being called weapons of *mass disruption.*

Never have the dangers associated with weapons of mass effect — nuclear, biological, chemical and cyber — been more pervasive. The newest threat is the possibility of attack from cyberspace. Although cyberspace is critical to our economy and our security, its potential for terror, crime, and attack is the least-understood threat we face. Strategic information warfare could be a greater danger than armies, cannons, and airplanes. Digital weaponry can outflank and circumvent military establishments and compromise the underpinnings of our military and civilian infrastructure, which are now one and the same.

It is the explosion of the information revolution that has created our new enemy: cyberwarriors. Cybersoldiers can be individuals, mad hackers, or wealthy messianic ideologues, like Osama bin Laden. They can work for terrorist groups, rogue nations, or even peaceful governments like our own. Using the tools of information warfare, cyberterrorists can overload telephone lines with special software; disrupt the operations of air traffic control, as well as shipping and railroad computers; scramble the software used by major financial institutions, hospitals, and other emergency services; alter by remote control the formulas for medication at pharmaceutical plants; change the pressure in gas pipelines to cause a valve failure; and sabotage the New York Stock Exchange.

"The cyberspace revolution is both our essential enabler and our critical vulnerability," says former National Security Agency (NSA) director Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan.

Inherently insecure

One reason for our vulnerability is the open architecture of the digital revolution. Our highly networked environment has been built on an intentionally insecure foundation: ARPANET, the Internet's predecessor, which devised packet-switching as a means of communication, was never intended to be secure. As a consequence, our interconnected vital national functions, from credit card transactions to emergency services and our electrical grid, now present a target-rich environment ➔

Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He co-chaired the Advisory Committee to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE THREAT OF A LONE HACKER: Top: Ehud Tenebaum, 18, was arrested and criminally charged for his part in a computer attack on the Pentagon's security system. Below: "Mudge" told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that computer security is so lax that he and his fellow hackers could disable the entire Internet in half an hour.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Containing loose nukes

A weak Russia is a threat to our security.

KEYS TO PEACE: The author is shown with Senator Richard Lugar turning the keys to destroy a former Soviet nuclear missile silo in Ukraine. Nunn and Lugar sponsored legislation to promote Russian disarmament after the Cold War.

One of the biggest threats to our security today is not Russia's strength, but Russia's weakness. Russia's loss of empire, crumbling conventional military, eroding warning systems, and increased reliance on nuclear forces and early launch make them a potential threat to international stability. At the same time, Russia's weak control of its nuclear materials puts the world at risk.

Nothing is more central to international security today than ensuring that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferant states. Our goal should be a world in which all nuclear materials are safe and accounted for "from cradle to grave," with sufficient transparency to reassure the world. In cooperation with Russia, we should undertake a series of measures to reach this goal. The cost of these programs would be dwarfed by the cost in monetary and human terms of a single nuclear incident caused by stolen materials and used against a single target.

Among our priorities, we should initiate a joint U.S.-Russian warning system to coordinate scientific missile launches and avoid mistaken attack warnings. We should also enter a joint U.S.-Russian de-alert program, so that it would take days, not minutes, to arm our ICBMs with warheads.

To protect nuclear materials from theft, smuggling, and unauthorized sale, the United States should join with Russia to create a joint law enforcement center. We could also accelerate cooperative efforts to consolidate Russia's fissile materials in fewer locations.

Finally, we would be well served by investing heavily in a buy-and-bury program to build down the supply of fissile materials. With these measures, we can begin to seal leaks in Russia's nuclear materials security.

—Sam Nunn

for cyberterrorists, computer gangsters, and malicious hackers, as well as for sophisticated state-directed computer experts. This openness, which has made the United States the leader in information technology, has greatly increased our efficiency and productivity, but it has also made us vulnerable. While preserving our openness and our connectivity, we must address our vulnerability.

The truth is that the United States and other developed nations are inevitably exposed to cyberwar. President Clinton has said, "Intentional attacks against our critical systems are already under way." Offensive Information Warfare (IW) capability is something many nations seek.

"These countries recognize that cyber attacks .... against civilian computer systems in the United States represent the kind of asymmetric option they need to level the playing field," says CIA Director George Tenet.

Vulnerabilities

How vulnerable are we? Consider some examples:

- In 1997, a Red Team put together by the American intelligence community pretended to be North Korea. Some 35 computer specialists, using hacking tools freely available on 1,900 Web sites, got access that would have allowed them to shut down large segments of America's power grid and disrupt the communications system of the Pacific Command in Honolulu. Called *Eligible Receiver,* the operation showed how easy it would be to cripple critical military and civilian computer networks — and to avoid detection.
- The Defense Information Systems Agency launched some 38,000 attacks against its own systems to test their vulnerabilities. Only five percent of the people in charge of targeted systems realized they were under attack and, of these, only four percent reported the intrusion to a superior authority. Security has been improved since the test.

Those were gaming probes. In the real world, computer hackers, driven by every-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thing from mischief to hatred, already have amassed an extensive track record:

- In 1994, a 16-year-old English youth temporarily took down 100 unclassified U.S. defense systems.
- Two years ago, hackers rerouted 911 emergency calls in Florida to sex-service numbers.
- An Israeli hacker code-named "The Analyzer" joined with two California hackers to launch cyberattacks on the Pentagon, the National Security Agency, and the national labs, disrupting troop movements.
- A computer hacker who called himself the Phantom Dialer seized control of important networks around the world — at universities, corporations, banks, federal agencies, and military facilities. He even hacked into top-secret weapons sites. When an FBI investigative team finally traced the hacking to a 20-year-old in Portland, Ore., they discovered he had severe brain damage from viral hepatitis. The FBI decided not to prosecute.
- Operating out of a warehouse in Boston, a group of hackers known as "LOhpt" claims it has uncovered the critical phone numbers needed to shut down the U.S. electrical grid. Yet this same group has also been praised by the National Security Council for helping to close security loopholes, illustrating the fine and destabilizing line between good and bad uses of computer expertise. Today's curious kid can be tomorrow's cyberterrorist.

The smaller players

With the United States' emergence in the past decade as the dominant military force in the world, cyberwar alternatives have become the obvious preferred option of smaller players. Logic bombs, Trojan horses, worms, viruses, denial of service, and other information warfare tools are now the arsenal whereby even marginal foes can take on a superpower that can no longer be challenged with conventional weapons. "In today's electronic environment, many haters can become Saddam Hussein[s]," says a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Or perhaps a Saddam look-alike can become a threat in a new and different way. Imagine this scenario: After Saddam's defeat in Desert Storm, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi realizes that he cannot confront the United States directly, even with chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons. He instructs his intelligence agency to begin high-priority interviews with young Libyans who have computer skills. The agency recruits the 25 best and brightest among them and gives them a top-secret assignment: Find the electronic and digital vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy, including those in telecommunications, energy, finance, transportation, and emergency services. They are told: You will have unlimited resources and full political backing at the highest levels. Give us a quarterly report on your ability to plant computer germs, to confuse critical computer networks, and to bring down key nodes controlling America's infrastructure — by city and by region. The future of Libya depends on you and your skills. You must be ready to implement by January 2000.

This sounds like science fiction, and I did make it up. But it is entirely plausible and may even be happening right now. America's adversaries know that the country's real assets are in electronic storage, not in Fort Knox. They also know that our privately owned critical infrastructure is far more vulnerable than our military. The profusion of virtual corporations, cashless electronic transactions, and economies without inventories, based on just-in-time deliveries, will make attacks on data just as destructive as attacks on physical inventories.

How do we prepare a cyberdefense in the digital age? One of the first dilemmas is figuring out who the enemy is. Distinguishing a terrorist from a hacker, or a foreign intelligence agent from a competitor stealing secrets, is not easy. Today we often have to apprehend the culprit before we know who has jurisdiction to investigate.

The sandal culture

We also have to redefine whom our defenders will be. Many of tomorrow's defending warriors will be young computer wizards. The sandal culture is challenging the wingtips and the combat boots. The CSIS report noted that NSA's electronic sheriff, responsible for protecting NSA's ground stations, was a ➔

"Many of tomorrow's defending warriors will be young computer wizards. The sandal culture is challenging the wingtips and the combat boots. One of the government's most critical needs is a dedicated and sustainable pool of computer talent."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

E-terror in cyberspace/Peter A. Wilson

A fictional cyberattack shows how vulnerable we are.

The crisis: A Middle East state believes the time is ripe for a power grab in the Persian Gulf. It menaces an oil-rich neighbor that the United States is pledged to protect. Determined not to repeat Saddam Hussein's mistake, the aggressors avoid a head-on military confrontation with America. They take a more insidious route, attacking the West's critical information infrastructure.

In the United States, Canada, and Europe, mayhem cascades through computer systems. A stealthy war of digital corruption sent through the silence of cyberspace has begun, but no one yet realizes it. Logic bombs, computer viruses, and malicious mouse clicks don't make much noise.

The attack: As the assault escalates, computer-controlled telephone systems in the United States crash and are paralyzed for hours. Trains are rerouted by remote computer control and collide, killing scores and injuring hundreds. Oil refineries explode into fire as computerized flow-control mechanisms mysteriously fail. Electronic "sniffers" sabotage the global financial system by disrupting international fund-transfer networks, causing stocks to plunge on the New York and London exchanges. At street level, many Americans are stunned to learn that automatic teller machines are randomly crediting or debiting thousands of dollars to and from their accounts. News of the financial maelstrom spreads panic across the country, and people rush to make withdrawals.

Meanwhile, U.S. defense systems are invaded. Computerized attacks paralyze the phones at overseas bases. Computers slow down, disconnect, and crash. Some of the military's sophisticated computer-controlled weapon systems exhibit flickering screens and other signs of electronic malaise. The Internet is flooded with calls for massive rallies to protest U.S. war preparations.

This alarming, but fictional, outbreak of information warfare conducted across several continents was gamed by RAND's National Defense Research Institute in 1995. These events show the opportunities our adversaries have for cybermischief. We face a host of key issues. Among them are:

CYBERWAR FOR EVERYONE: Computer users can launch attacks even from the most innocent-looking places, like this Internet café in Teheran.

Encryption Rules — The successful emergence of e-commerce depends on powerful encryption standards to give assurances of privacy, safety and soundness to both the owner and the consumer of the digital infrastructure — say, the Internet book buyer and a company like amazon.com or Barnes & Noble. Yet law enforcement and intelligence services are loath to see encryption technology emerge unfettered. The question is whether the federal government should have access to commercially generated and privately held, encrypted data; the answer depends on how one balances private interests (economic efficiency and personal security) and public interests (public safety and national security). The bias to protect Internet traffic as speech may have to be modified in the name of economic and financial safety.

Industry-Government Cooperation — A fundamental challenge is inspiring the creation of effective public, private and hybrid institutions for sharing between two cultures that are normally at odds — the government and the private sectors. Legislation is needed to address the unresolved and highly contentious issues of privacy, antitrust law, and the Freedom of Information Act.

Warning and Response — A major warning-and-response system must be created. Since the distinction between war threats and other types of crimes is blurred, this raises questions about the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence organizations. Designing a system that allows collaboration with our key allies, especially those in NATO and in Northeast Asia, is a special challenge.

E-Commerce and Financial Crime — The emergence of Internet banking, Internet gambling, and smart card (stored value) systems requires highly encrypted financial architectures that will severely stress financial regulation and law enforcement systems. Yet because these new technologies are ideally suited for criminal uses — especially money laundering — we must devise a new array of national and international regulatory regimes.

The challenge is to develop a coherent strategy for dealing with these complex and dynamic issues. Although the issue may not loom large in the presidential campaign of 2000, it will severely test the next administration. As we reap the enormous opportunities and wealth generated by the Internet in the 21st century, we will also be confronted with the digital dark side of the information revolution. How well we succeed at controlling tomorrow's electronic crime and cyberwarfare depends on how well we make critical policy decisions today.

Peter A. Wilson is a senior professional staff member at RAND in Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not of RAND or its clients.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

23-year-old GS-14. In the civilian world, "techies" are moving into senior management positions. One of the government's most critical needs, from the intelligence community to the Pentagon, is a dedicated and sustainable pool of computer talent. The Clinton Administration has proposed a cybercorps of ROTC-type cadets who would be trained from an early stage in information security. But this huge personnel challenge can be met only with the help of the private sector.

A key to the success of cyberdefense is understanding that it is no longer armed troops and killing machines that, alone, stand between us and an aggressor. It is our entire cyberworld. The private sector plays as large a role as the military community in designing our new defense. For years, government led the way in developing the first large-scale computational computers, the first electronic computers, the first microprocessor, the GPS system, and the Internet itself. Today, however, it is a different game. Private R&D efforts often exceed those of the government. Industry today is responsible for a large portion of developments on basic research in information technologies.

Industry's role

Private industry, of course, has its own huge stake in security. And while government leadership is essential, it is obvious that the business community must assume much responsibility for protecting itself — and for doing the cutting-edge research necessary to shield our public systems, civilian and military, from attack. We must avoid over-regulation so as not to stifle innovation. Yet we cannot leave the direction of our defense purely to market forces. Like the Wild West of the last century, our new frontier of information is exciting, and we must retain the freedom to roam and grow. But if the bad guys shoot up the town every weekend and drunken cowboys ride their horses into the saloon, don't be surprised when the public calls for law and order.

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, headed by retired Gen. Robert T. Marsh, emphasized the importance of new public/private partnerships. Open and honest information sharing between business and government is urgently needed. Businesses should also share more information among themselves, even though this runs counter to their competitive instincts. Top corporate executives, who run much of our civilian infrastructure, must make information security a top priority — the chief executive officer must understand the challenges of the chief information officer. In addition, the federal government should provide more support for research and increase public awareness of the threat from cyberspace. Finally, we must design new international frameworks for organizing multilateral cyberdefenses with our friends and allies.

In addition to these initiatives, our first challenge should be to prepare and train for cyberattack and its consequences, just as we've done for conventional or nuclear warfare. Our frontline response teams, whether police, fire, medical, or corporate information managers, must be properly prepared and equipped and must practice scenarios and operational plans.

The president's fiscal year 2000 budget called for $1.4 billion in information security funding. Approximately 80 percent of these funds are for the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies. While these are the right priorities, there is not enough funding for other agencies. Only $70 million is slated for research and development, one-third the amount that the Marsh Commission recommended. This essential funding must assume a higher priority.

The challenge from cyberspace presents problems that cannot be solved all at once and never once and for all. The threats will be dynamic and continuing, and our defense must also be able to adapt and change rapidly. In the end, there is no perfect defense. There is only awareness, vigilance, and a commitment to protect our nation against cyberwarfare and other weapons of mass effect. We are at the beginning of a deadly serious, high-stakes game, and we must devote the same resources to it that we did to winning the Cold War. With sufficient education, understanding, and funding, we can succeed. ■

"The private sector plays as large a role as the military community in designing our new defense. While government leadership is essential, it is obvious that the business community must assume much responsibility for protecting itself — and for doing the cutting-edge research necessary to shield our public systems, civilian and military, from attack."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The bio-chem *threat*

by Zachary Selden

ACCORDING TO A RECENT Pew Research Center poll, almost two-thirds of Americans think there will probably be a major terrorist attack on this country involving biological or chemical weapons. With the images of Israeli civilians donning protective gear during the Gulf War and of Japanese commuters gasping for air after the infamous subway gas attack in 1995, the gas mask has become the symbol of fear in the 1990s, much as the backyard bomb shelter was in the 1950s. It has become an article of faith that the United States is highly vulnerable to chemical and biological terrorism. Many experts say the question is when, not if, an American city will suffer a chemical or biological attack.

But is this a reasonable perception? At first glance, it might seem so. The Aum Shinrikyo gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 was a wake-up call. The psychological barrier that prevented terrorist groups from using weapons of mass destruction had been breached. Over the last few years, many experts in and out of government, this writer included, have expressed alarm over the growing risk of chemical and biological attack by terrorists and over our lack of preparedness. Although our fears have not been realized, there are several trends that force us to take the threat seriously. One of →

THE FACE OF OUR TIME: Since the Gulf war, the gas mask has become the new icon of fear, like bomb shelters in the 1950s. These Israeli students practiced wearing their masks during school.

Zachary Selden directs the "New Tools, New Teams for New Threats" program at Business Executives for National Security.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saddam still has secret factories, and Aum Shinrikyo showed how to attack with gas. But the likelihood of biological and chemical warfare may be less than we thought.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"When Defense Secretary William Cohen held up a five-pound bag of sugar and announced that the same amount of anthrax could devastate a major city, he vastly overstated the threat."

the most worrisome developments is that the expertise needed to produce highly sophisticated biological agents is rapidly proliferating.

Even if complex genetic engineering is beyond the reach of many potential users, lower-level microbiological expertise is spreading, and techniques such as DNA splicing and microencapsulation (used to "weaponize" bacteria) are becoming commonplace. While these processes are not simple, they are easily within the grasp of anyone with an advanced degree in microbiology.

In addition, the equipment needed to manufacture biological agents is up for grabs on the global market. Most of it is designed for "dual use" and can produce life-saving medicines or deadly microbes. As developing countries build their own pharmaceutical industries, they can also produce sophisticated biological weapons.

Most important, the will to use biological agents may be increasing among some terrorist organizations — fanatical ethnic and religious groups, whose motivations cannot be understood in political terms. Unconcerned with political backlash, such groups are not constrained by popular opinion, which matters only to organizations seeking political legitimacy.

Although these trends are troubling, we must build real protection, not be carried away on a wave of fear. When Defense Secretary William Cohen held up a five-pound bag of sugar and gravely announced that the same amount of anthrax could devastate a major city, he vastly overstated the threat. Similarly, President Clinton sparked alarm with his assertion before the National Academy of Sciences that unspecified "enemies of peace" were intent on attacking America with biological weapons. As a result of such hyperbole, the FBI had to investigate 150 biological and chemical weapons hoaxes in a single year, up tenfold.

It is time to throttle back the rhetoric and take a more realistic look at the biological threat. There are two compelling reasons for a reconsideration. First, while brewing a biological agent is fairly simple and increasingly within the reach of bad actors, turning such an agent into an actual weapon is technically complex and far beyond the capability of most terrorist groups. Second, the United States has done a great deal over the past three years to contain acts of chemical or biological terrorism.

Combined, these two factors make the threat less menacing or, at least, less imminent.

Let's consider the first factor. Any would-be bioterrorist could produce a crude batch of anthrax, for example, if he can get a sample. He could simply place the sample in a vat with a food source for the bacteria and wait. But what would emerge would be a bacterial sludge that would have to be freeze-dried and milled to precise tolerances in order to be deadly. If the spores were too large, they would be coughed out by prospective victims; if too small, they would harmlessly pass through the walls of the victim's lungs. Finally, the terrorist would have to spray the bacteria in such a way that each victim received enough to become infected. It takes at least 8,000 spores of anthrax to infect an individual; otherwise, the attack goes unnoticed. All these steps require a group with skills in bacteriology, pharmaceutical production, weather and wind calculation, and engineering. It is interesting to note that Aum Shinrikyo tried and failed to develop biological weapons. The group was well-funded and staffed with Ph.D.s in various scientific disciplines, yet could not produce a viable biological weapon.

In addition to the technological hurdles they face, biological or chemical attackers may be less of a threat today than they were only 18 months ago because our government has embarked on a major civil defense effort. Sens. Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici created the original funding for a program that trains fire, police, and emergency workers across the country to contain chemical and biological attacks. A national coordinator for counter-terrorism is now in charge of bringing the disparate resources of the federal government to bear against the threat. The National Guard is setting up specialized teams to assist local fire and police. A program for stockpiling vaccines and antidotes is under consideration.

All these measures — funded by $600 million

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from Congress this year alone — have gone some distance toward ameliorating the threat.

This does not mean we can lower our guard. The essence of security is detailed preparation, and more remains to be done. A bioterrorism incident is an instant public health crisis, so medical workers must have the right training to recognize unusual disease outbreaks and efficiently report them to a central tracking center. The first indications of an attack are likely to mimic a flu epidemic; if local doctors do not recognize the telltale signs of a biological incident, they will misdiagnose the situation with disastrous results. While some funding has gone toward solving this problem recently, we need to step up efforts to educate the medical community in the early warning signs of biological attacks. One key is a robust and effective public health information infrastructure.

There is nothing inevitable about chemical and biological terrorism. In fact, the better prepared we are to contain such an incident, the less likely it is to occur. Our weak link, however, is identifying diseases quickly, then communicating and coordinating the response. New York City's recent experience of taking 23 days to correctly identify West Nile encephalitis is a glaring case in point. We are already spending a lot of money on fighting this threat. Now we need to make sure we're spending it in the right way. ■

CROSSING THE LINE: In 1995, sarin gas was released in the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 and injuring thousands. Shoko Asahara, leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, is still on trial for his role in the terror.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHO'S WINNING NOW? President Yeltsin has seen Russia's attempts at democratization and market capitalism roiled in corruption.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nobody lost Russia

GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD: IMF loans helped Russians, like these at the Moscow stock exchange, dig themselves into horrible debt.

Russia is not too big to fail, but the blackmail game should end. We should stay engaged while applying tough love.

by Michael A. McFaul

Is Russia lost? To read the barrage of op-ed articles, congressional testimony, and political position papers that have flowed from both the left and the right since last summer, one might have concluded that Russia is dead and gone — and the Clinton Administration is to blame. It is true that eight years after the fall of communism, Russia is riddled with corruption, its politics are unstable, and the structures of democracy and free markets have yet to strike deep roots. There is also a resurgent anti-Western element in Russian politics. But Russia is not lost.

On the contrary, despite real setbacks regarding reform and integration into the Western system, Russia still aspires to build a democratic polity, consolidate a market economy, and join the Western community of states. Although opinion polls demonstrate that Russians are disappointed with the performance of Russian capitalism and Russian democracy, most people still want to improve these new political and economic systems rather than go back to communism. No serious political leader or party, not even the Communist Party, advocates returning to the command economy or resurrecting dictatorship.

The Russia-is-lost Cassandras argue that Russia's current parlous state can be blamed on U.S. policy over the past decade, primarily our support of profligate International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. A second group of finger-waggers argues that the United States was wrong to try to engineer domestic change within Russia in the first place.

While both these arguments are wrong, it is true that policies which were appropriate yesterday to help Russia pursue domestic reform and integration into the Western community may no longer be appropriate. As conditions in Russia change, so too should U.S. policy. The 2000 presidential elections in both the United States and Russia offer a propitious moment to reframe the bilateral relationship.

Depoliticize and Democratize the U.S–IMF–Russia Relationship

The political argument for more IMF assistance even after loans were defaulting was a form of nuclear blackmail based on the notion that because of its huge warhead arsenal, "Russia was too big to fail." Russian leaders cleverly exploited this argument, hinting that civil war, anarchy, or fascist dictatorship might follow in the land of 20,000 nukes if the West withdrew assistance. They thus guaranteed the continued flow of loans without making the economic reforms that other, non-nuclear powers are compelled to adopt before obtaining Western aid.

This game should stop. Whatever the political merits of IMF loans to Russia in the past, they have now disappeared. U.S. officials should refrain from using the IMF as a conduit for politically motivated aid to Russia. If the next U.S. president wants to provide assistance to the Russian government for political reasons, then that money should be transferred →

Michael A. McFaul is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University in California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"America's most effective tool in promoting markets and democracy is the example of the United States itself. The more Russians who are exposed to this model, the better. We should expand military-to-military exchanges, sister city programs, business-to-business meetings and especially educational programs for young Russians."

through the Agency for International Development or some other U.S. government agency, not through the IMF.

Fund officials are most effective in encouraging reform in Russia when they act like bankers rather than diplomats. The IMF must regain its credibility as an autonomous financial institution concerned first and foremost with assisting macroeconomic stabilization in Russia. If this approach means no new IMF loans to Russia in the foreseeable future, then so be it.

In return for reclaiming more autonomy over decisions of when and how much to lend Russia, the IMF's decision-making process must become more transparent. Greater openness will expose IMF decisions to greater scrutiny, which can only improve the quality of these decisions. Greater transparency will also allow more Russians to understand and influence the IMF-Russian relationship. More information about the execution of an IMF program should also be made available to the public as a way to help counter corruption.

Assist Russian Society, Not the Russian State

State reform in Russia will not be generated from within the state. Rather, state institutions will change only when there are strong societal groups pressuring them to reform. Yet Russian political and economic life today is dominated by the chummy conspiracy between the financial oligarchs and the authoritarian politicians; they constitute the greatest threat to Russian capitalism and democracy.

To counter this threat, the United States must assist economic and political groups that act as a check on this unholy alliance. This calls for a kind of "tough love" policy towards Boris Yeltsin's government and its successors. Except for nuclear threat reduction programs and some educational and medical assistance efforts, the U.S. government should eliminate all financial aid to Russian government bureaucracies. Instead of trying to assist the Russian president directly or state officials more generally, U.S. assistance should be channeled through non-governmental organizations, such as programs that lend money to small businesses. We should also back political parties, civic organizations, business associations, and trade unions — but not government bureaucrats. This would mean supporting public interest law organizations and providing seed money for a Russian Civil Liberties Union rather than funding Russian law enforcement officials.

America's most effective tool in promoting markets and democracy is the example of the United States itself. The more Russians who are exposed to this model, the better. We should expand military-to-military exchanges, sister city programs, business-to-business meetings, and especially educational programs for young Russians. Tens of thousands of Russian students, not dozens, should be enrolled in American universities.

Inside Russia, mass civic education projects should be promoted. Programs that increase the flow of information about successful business or political ventures in Russia should be encouraged. The demonstration effect of a profitable small business in the city of Perm will mean much more to a future entrepreneur in Novosibirsk than will a success story from Silicon Valley.

The best way to assist the development of Russian civil society is through small-grants programs that give money directly to Russian organizations. Programs with large budgets often translate into waste, corruption, and big salaries for Washington-based consultants. Organizations such as Internews (which assists the development of independent media in Russia), the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Eurasia Foundation are models at providing this kind of assistance on the proper scale. Although not in the business of grant-making, groups such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the AFL-CIO, and a host of smaller non-governmental organizations also facilitate the flow of ideas about civic organizing, advocacy, and democracy. These programs need support.

Less Arms Control, More Cooperative Arms Building

Throughout the Cold War, arms control dominated the agenda of U.S.-Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations. During periods when the United States and the Soviet Union clashed in several arenas both literally and figuratively, the arms control regimes kept open a channel of communication between the two superpowers. The very process of negotiating these agreements helped to ease tensions in the bilateral relationship.

Today, the opposite is true. At a time when the United States and Russia have begun to cooperate on a wide range of issues that would have been unthinkable in the Cold War era, arms control has stalled. In particular, the Russian parliament has refused for several years to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), even though it is in Russia's strategic and economic interests. Russian lawmakers have practiced the policy of linkage — an American invention from the Cold War days — in trying to obtain American concessions in other policy arenas in return for START II ratification. All they have achieved so far is delay.

U.S. foreign policy leaders can exit this game of blackmail by simply moving ahead unilaterally with arms reductions. The next American president should announce that the United States plans to reduce its arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons to the lowest level that will still give the United States a deterrence capability. Some have suggested that this number is 2,500; others have posited that the United States can go to as low as 1,000 warheads if all of these weapons are placed on submarines, safe from a first strike. Given Russia's dire financial situation, the Russian government is likely to reciprocate. To be sure, arms control agreements are preferable in that they provide better information about intentions and more opportunities for verification. Ironically, however, the United States and Russia are likely to achieve START II and even START III levels of nuclear weapons much faster if they stop negotiating these treaties and simply act unilaterally and encourage the other side to reciprocate.

If the U.S. objective of reducing strategic nuclear weapons might be achieved better through less engagement with Russia, the objective of developing and deploying missile defenses is best achieved through greater cooperation. In the spirit of Ronald Reagan's original speech on the Strategic Defense Initiative, the United States should seek to develop missile defense technologies in full cooperation with Russia, even if the United States has to foot the entire bill. Persuasive as money always is to countries in deep financial trouble, this might soften Russian resistance to amending the ABM treaty, while also giving us the benefit of Russia's technology and scientific personnel in developing these systems. Recent successes in negotiations about Shared Early Warning suggest that the United States and Russia can devise regimes for cooperation that enhance the security of both countries. We owe it to ourselves to try. ■

"U.S. foreign policy leaders can exit this game of blackmail by simply moving ahead unilaterally with arms reductions."

LITTLE PEOPLE GET HURT: Russian pensioners confront an officer of a failed bank in Moscow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The next turbulent zone

by Robert Satloff

AFTER A HALF-DECADE IN WHICH the Balkans, Central Africa, and East Asia were the hottest spots on the globe, the Middle East — including North Africa — is likely to assert itself over the next five years as a zone of turbulence. Some of the turmoil will be fueled by the irredentism left over from the Arab-Israeli dispute, especially among disgruntled Palestinians and Islamists opposed to the very idea of peace (see sidebar, p. 50). However, the lion's share of the region's instability will be generated by internal upheavals within Middle Eastern and North African countries and the stubborn refusal of so many in the region to join the new millennium's globalization revolution. The region will enter the 21st century with new, untested leaders from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf, stagnant economies that produce little that the world wants, and frightening, high-technology weaponry with the potential to bring local conflicts to America's shores.

In addition to the old disputes and conflicts that the new century will inherit, the coming period will be characterized by a leadership challenge, a globalization challenge, and a proliferation challenge. ➔

A WAVE OF CHANGE? Protesting students in Teheran challenge the power of the mullahs in Iranian political life.

Robert Satloff is the executive director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Middle East faces upheavals in leadership change, lagging globalization, and nuclear proliferation. How to promote stability in a time of turmoil.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arab-Israeli peace process

Despite warm embraces, only incremental steps can be expected.

The election of Ehud Barak fueled expectations of speedy success in the peace process, on both the Palestinian-Israeli track and the Syrian/Lebanese-Israeli track. Yet while progress is likely, a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is not.

Despite positive steps like the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh accord, the Israeli national "consensus" and the Palestinian national "consensus" still remain far apart on core issues (e.g., territory, Jerusalem, and refugees). In Syria, the key obstacle remains what it has been for years — the profound ambivalence of Syria's Hafiz al-Assad. Even as he tells visitors of his yearning for "peace" with Israel, he apparently fears such an agreement would force open Syria's closed society, weakening his iron-fisted control. This may be a higher price than he is willing to pay for the return of the Golan Heights.

The next half-decade is likely to see incremental progress — perhaps including the establishment of an internationally recognized Palestinian mini-state on territory within the West Bank and Gaza. But even this will probably not end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which will persist at various levels of intensity, tension, and violence. The forces of irredentism and rejection will also continue to harass the peacemakers and threaten to undermine what progress has been achieved.

The challenge for U.S. policy is to advance overall U.S. interests in a stable, peaceful, pro-West Levant by:

- pursuing steady, incremental progress while protecting against a backlash of unfulfilled expectations.
- lowering Palestinian and Syrian ambitions in order to heighten the prospect of near-term success.
- investing in Jordan, which is pivotal but vulnerable, and deepening trade links within a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli economic space.
- increasing people-to-people exchanges among erstwhile adversaries to inculcate a "culture of peace" in the region so that sterile government-to-government agreements can take root in a milieu of economic, educational, and social interaction among Arabs and Israelis.

While the United States is promoting these key policy goals, it is also very important that the vital elements of the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship be insulated from ups and downs in the Arab-Israeli negotiations.

PUSHING FOR PEACE: Barak and Arafat make nice, but can they also make progress?

Given common U.S. and Israeli regional threats — especially from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction — it is essential to build a firewall around this bilateral alliance. Only then can we focus our resources on moving the peace process forward.

— Robert Satloff

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These three trends, expected to intensify over the next five years, will place an unprecedented set of internal tensions on pro- and anti-western regimes alike.

The Leadership Challenge

For the last quarter-century, the longevity of Middle Eastern leaders has belied the region's notorious reputation for instability. In fact, with rulers as disparate as Hassan II of Morocco, Qaddafi of Libya, Hussein of Jordan, and al-Assad of Syria, the Middle East could until 1999 claim a leadership cohort older and longer-serving than any other region in the world. This is changing. A trend that began with the bloodless coup in Qatar in 1995 and the Israeli election of 1996 picked up steam in 1999 with a new generation of leaders coming to power in Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco. Succession talk is already at fever pitch in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority, all ruled by ill, elderly men. Even Egypt, governed by a septuagenarian, is not immune. And many hope that Iraq will soon join the list of countries due for a leadership replacement, since "regime change" became an official U.S. policy goal in 1998 (see sidebar, p. 56). By the end of the next decade, the actuarial tables will make the Middle East look different from any time in the last generation.

While the local situations differ from country to country, the new crop of Middle East leaders will all face a common problem: how to maintain their uncertain hold on power and build legitimacy in the shadow of their generally imposing predecessors. The outcomes will differ. In some countries a weakening of the central government may permit latent ethnic and religious animosities to emerge with ferocity. This is especially the case among three states long inimical to U.S. interests in the region: Iraq, divided among Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and the majority Shi'ite Arabs; Syria, where the minority Alawite sect governs a largely Sunni Muslim country; and Sudan, where Sunni Muslims battle Christians and animists for control of the country's large southern region. Anti-Western regimes that have proved resistant to change, such as Syria and Libya, may collapse in a Romania-like spasm of violence — or find a way to survive this set of challenges.

While pro-Western regimes are still likely to rely on U.S. security guarantees for their defense, some will grow progressively less willing to provide active support for U.S. political and military initiatives and may seek medium-term security in reducing regional tensions (e.g., a deepening of Saudi rapprochement with Iran). Some of these countries will succeed by responding flexibly and creatively to the challenge. But those whose regimes remain closed, autocratic, and highly centralized are likely to grow defensive and inward-looking. Ironically, history suggests that the monarchies (e.g., Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) have the best chance of absorbing and dealing with change, while the region's pseudo-republics such as Syria and Iraq — almost all born in violence and radicalism — are the least capable of nimble responses.

Almost everywhere, however, the byword will be uncertainty. For U.S. policy, there are at least three key implications:

- Allies in the Gulf and North Africa will need patience, support, assurance and, at times, "tough love" on economic and political reform to help make a peaceful and secure generational transition.
- Opportunities will exist, at least on the margin, to promote pro-Western changes in traditionally adversarial regimes, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. The United States should reach out to the "people" by promoting freer markets, freer communication, and freer travel (see sidebar, p. 54). In times of transition, ideas and values matter enormously.
- Post-Arafat, the Palestinian Authority (or its successor entity) stands a chance of emerging as a laboratory of democracy in the Arab world. By focusing on the need for good governance, transparency, and accountability, the United States can help develop a regional partner that is pro-Western, pluralist, and democratic. Washington has the standing to tell the Palestinians that democracy and security can be advanced simultaneously; making them mutually exclusive creates a false choice. ➔

"The new crop of Middle East leaders faces a common problem: how to maintain their hold on power and build legitimacy in the shadow of their imposing predecessors."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Turkey presents a model of a healthy Muslim-majority democracy with a thriving economy that Central Asian republics are more keen to emulate than are Middle Easterners."

The Globalization Challenge

Each of the region's new leaders will inherit a country suffering from systemic economic malaise and the cultural/ideological challenge posed by the spread of globalization. The malaise is the result of decades of failed economic policies and a sustained depression in world oil prices. The anxiety over cultural dislocation emanates from both the "regime" and the "street." Both the governors and the governed share a reluctance to open themselves to free trade, open communication, and the risk-taking spirit of the 21st-century economy. The regimes fear that globalization will empower the citizenry against them; much of the general population fears that the heady mix of Internet linkups, satellite dishes, and cable television will threaten its traditional way of life.

As the rest of the world gallops into globalization, miniaturization, and information-based economies, the Middle East and North Africa remain largely impervious to change. As a result, the region is becoming less relevant, at an alarming rate, to the global economy. According to the World Bank, Middle Eastern economies are growing at only two-thirds the pace of other developing countries, even more slowly than those in sub-Saharan Africa. Per capita incomes in Arab countries did not grow at all from 1985 through 1995, when developing countries as a whole registered a 32 percent increase (80 percent in East Asia). And Middle Easterners themselves are investing far too little to reverse these trends. For example, literacy in the Arab states is no higher than that in sub-Saharan Africa, even though Arab states have more than twice the income. Part of the problem is that Middle Easterners hold a larger portion of their wealth abroad — $350 billion — than do people in any other part of the world. The result, concludes one World Bank report, is that the Middle East has been "disengaging from the world economy."

At the same time, Middle Eastern countries are conspicuously absent from the global tide toward freedom and democracy. While some small countries have registered notable progress, such as Kuwait and Yemen, the Middle East is today the world's most undemocratic region. According to Freedom



THE OLD GUARD: Left: Hafez el-Assad, 71, holds stubbornly to power in Syria. Right: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is ill, and the succession has unofficially already begun.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

House, not one of the 23 Arab League members (nor Iran) is among the 88 countries in the world that are designated as "free." Of the 13 most repressive countries in the world, the Middle East is home to six.

The exceptions to both trends — economic and political — are, of course, Israel and Turkey.

Israel is the region's economic and technological powerhouse. While some in the region want to emulate Israel's embrace of globalization — there are pockets of progress in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere — too many view the Israeli high-tech juggernaut with fear and dread. The Arab world's cool response to former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres' concept of a "new Middle East," animated by a regional market rather than ancient animosities, is typical of the weak cooperation in the region. Sadly, it denies many their best chance of hitching a ride on the globalization train.

Similarly, Turkey presents a model of a healthy Muslim-majority democracy with a thriving economy that Central Asian republics are more keen to emulate than are Middle Easterners. For the United States, Turkey is a "pivotal state" critical to the success of U.S. policy in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Ensuring the continued vitality of Turkey — both for its own sake and for the powerful demonstration value to the Muslim world — is an important U.S. interest. Ironically, at a moment of growing strategic significance to the United States, Turkey is facing a triple threat of Islamism, rising Kurdish national consciousness, and — after the devastating 1999 earthquakes — a crisis of confidence in the institutions of state. Combined, these threats have thrust Turkey into one of its most fragile political moments since the founding of the secular republic in 1923.

The Proliferation Challenge

One arena in which Middle Easterners do, regrettably, set the pace is in the most chilling threat to U.S. security in the next century — the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. After having faced the awesome conventional superiority of U.S. forces in the Gulf War (and the power of a U.S.-supplied military like Israel's), →

"One arena in which Middle Easterners set the pace is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

THE NEW GENERATION: Left: King Abdullah of Jordan has taken up his late father's mantle, but can he maintain stability? Right: Moroccan King Mohamed VI succeeded his father, whose rule for 38 years kept the desert kingdom moving forward.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iran

Welcome change is coming to Iran, but so is the risk of nuclear weapons.

Iran's great internal debate over its future, as evidenced in recent confrontations between demonstrating students and police, is likely to sharpen and deepen in the next five years. The two protagonists here are not, as often reported, the popularly elected progressive President Mohammed Khatami and the conservative Islamic Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i. Rather, the competing forces are the atavistic advocates of continued clerical rule and reformists who favor a clear separation between clerical and political authorities. Khatami, contrary to Western belief, remains a devotee of the theistic state, though one with a human face.

Because this is an internal contest for the future of Iran, Washington should be modest about its role in determining the outcome. Nevertheless, we have a strong interest in the success of the anti-clerical forces. They are the overwhelming majority of the people — the 70 percent of the Iranian electorate who thronged to the polls in 1997 to vote for Khatami because he was the least objectionable candidate permitted on the tightly circumscribed ballot. It is in America's interest to support the Iranian people, even though they are not necessarily pro-Western and embody a streak of Persian nationalism that could challenge the U.S. goal of security in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. policy should not be driven by whether initiatives "help Khatami" or "hurt Khatami;" he is not the critical figure in the outcome of the clerical/anti-clerical competition. Instead, U.S. policy should be targeted to encourage the "70 percent" to sustain their effort to change Iran. Our initiatives should reach out directly to the Iranian people by lifting sanctions on exporting personal consumer goods and by increasing the number of visas allotted to Iranians, while demanding reciprocity in return. We should also significantly expand educational, entertainment, and informational programming on radio and television beamed to Iran, especially on the Persian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. These initiatives need to be packaged boldly; otherwise, Iran can portray them as inadequate responses to Khatami's call for "a dialogue of civilizations."

A TRANSFER OF POWER? Islamic Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i, left, and President Mohammed Khatami, right, are at odds over reforms and governance.

While supporting the people, we should target the government. We should continue to deprive the Iranian regime of capital and outside investment that would resuscitate its economy. In recent years, Washington has registered considerable success in drying up resources for Iranian military expenditure while exacerbating the regime's economic situation. And while we should work with Iran in those areas where interests overlap (e.g., Afghanistan), we must avoid any unnecessary bolstering of a regime that is substantially weaker today than it was a decade ago.

Despite this weakness, Iran remains a serious threat to the region and to the world. If successful, its effort to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will thrust Iran to the top of the global security agenda. In addition, Iran remains deeply involved in terrorism. If the regime begins to crack from within, acts of political violence will probably increase. Working with Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, Iran might open new terrorism fronts against Israel and the United States. Overseas attacks, like the 1992 Hezbollah bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina, could become the rule, not the exception. If progress is to be made on Israeli-Lebanese peace, Iran will have to be pressed to stop shipping arms to Hezbollah via flights that Syria could end at any time. And if Iran is, indeed, found to have been involved in the 1996 terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia or is harboring the culprits of that outrage, then President Clinton's commitment to track down and punish those responsible must be honored.

In the end, events in Iran require a two-tiered U.S. response: We must do all we can to encourage the "70 percent" reform surge, while at the same time maintaining high vigilance against Iran's destabilizing behavior. In a race against time, assertive U.S. efforts may prove to be the factor that helps bring about real political change before the ayatollahs gain access to the most frightening weaponry in the world.

— Robert Satloff

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regimes across the Middle East have diverted their dwindling revenues away from traditional military spending into developing or acquiring vast supplies of unconventional arms. The result is a great race for strategic equalizers — chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles that can dispatch them to their targets in a matter of minutes. The most serious threats are as follows:

• U.S. intelligence sources confirm that the next decade may witness Iran's acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability and/or an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. This would radically change the nature of the Iranian threat. In that event, the focus of U.S. efforts would need to move from prevention and postponement to defense, deterrence, and possible aggressive preemption.

• The absence of any inspection of Saddam Hussein's Iraq since late 1998 requires any prudent planner to assume that the Iraqi dictator has restarted his once-vast program to develop weapons of mass destruction. Having already attacked four countries — Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel — Saddam is unlikely to give up his predatory behavior. The only uncertainty is the method of his next revenge attack — through conventional war, ballistic missile attack, or terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.

• The marriage of proliferation and international terrorism is an especially frightening prospect. Whether it is the seepage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union, the long arm of Hezbollah (which has already reached to Latin America), or the teaming-up of global terrorist Osama bin Laden and rogue leaders like Saddam, there is a growing possibility that Middle Eastern terrorists might strike with weapons of mass destruction against overseas American targets or even inside the United States itself — leaving no "fingerprints" or claims of responsibility.

Responding to these and other security challenges emanating from the Middle East requires a mix of unilateral measures and cooperative efforts with U.S. allies. Already, the United States has beefed up its own counterterrorism capability, taken measures to arrest the illicit flow of weapons technology, and begun to address the need for effective counterproliferation. Much more needs to be done, especially in the realm of missile defense.

Washington is uniquely placed to capitalize on the common interests among moderate, pro-Western states that have heretofore been divided by their own local conflicts, especially the Arab-Israeli dispute. States like Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey all share profound concerns over terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and missile proliferation. Individually, many have also expressed interest in such projects as a regional anti-missile defense initiative. Such an undertaking could start as a modest intelligence coordination effort supported by the United States and expand to a regional, real-time early-warning system and, potentially, to an even bolder integrated anti-missile system. Success, however, will require that Washington pay special attention to Egypt. Without high-level U.S. tending, the Egyptians will scuttle any regional missile defense initiative with highly publicized demands for Israeli concessions on nuclear issues.

These three challenges — leadership, globalization, and proliferation — will provide the new prisms through which to view regional political upheaval over the next decade. Until leadership changes and domestic politics sort themselves out, the Middle East and North Africa are likely to be increasingly inhospitable to major U.S. initiatives. But by the end of the next decade — when seismic internal change is likely to be completed in most major states — the region stands a good chance of being more peaceful, stable, and pro-West than it is today. The challenge for Washington is to manage this potentially turbulent transition in a way that protects U.S. interests and allies. ■

"There is a growing possibility that Middle Eastern terrorists might strike with weapons of mass destruction against overseas American targets or even inside the United States itself."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq

Iraq may become the next administration's biggest albatross. But Saddam is shaky, and we should give him a harder push.

"Saddam's coterie of supporters is shrinking to those directly dependent on him. Army deserters flock to opposition redoubts in the largely Kurdish north and the largely Shi'ite south. This is the time for the United States to press for Saddam's downfall."

Given current trends, Iraq will emerge as the foremost national security albatross around the neck of the next administration. Since the Clinton administration's welcome, if belated, 1998 declaration of "regime change" as a key goal in Iraq, a bold policy aimed at ousting Saddam Hussein from power is urgently called for.

Throughout the 1990s, the failure to engineer or demand regime change in Iraq after Desert Storm became the "original sin" of U.S. Middle East policy. The result was a containment strategy toward Saddam that began as an interim policy but evolved into a new status quo requiring enormous sums of human and financial capital. It has also drained the good will of allies, both regional and international. And despite this effort, Iraq today exports more oil than it did on the eve of the Gulf War and is able to pursue development of unconventional weapons without international supervision.

Yet Saddam's regime is shakier than many realize. His coterie of supporters is shrinking to those directly dependent on him. Army deserters continue to flock to opposition redoubts in the largely Kurdish north and the largely Shi'ite south. This is the time for the United States to press for Saddam's downfall with every technique at our disposal, from securing an international war crimes tribunal against Saddam to providing better weapons to his opponents, like the Kurds.

But we should go much further. Rather than making frequent pinprick air strikes in the "no fly" zones, we should grasp opportunities to attack Saddam where they will seriously damage his hold on power. With sufficient provocation, we should mount debilitating air strikes on the pillars of the regime: the secret police, Saddam's personal guard units, and the Iraqi command-and-control system. And, given Saddam's record, the provocations will surely come.

U.S. planners need to actively prepare for a window of political opportunity to attack Saddam. There are two plausible scenarios under which he might provoke the United States — and hopefully the Desert Storm coalition — to forcefully intervene with the international community's acceptance. The first would be Saddam's stymying the efforts of a new inspection regime cobbled together by the United Nations Security Council. The second would be Saddam's pursuing some sort of "breakout strategy," using terrorism, conventional military means, or even weapons of mass destruction.

There is, not surprisingly, widespread squeamishness in Washington about such an aggressive new strategy. The reluctance is less a fear of "going in" than a fear of "getting out" — the famous exit strategy issue. Like the man who fretted about what to do with his lottery winnings, such worries are misplaced. The prime objective is to unseat Saddam, and only a lack of U.S. leadership masks the widespread support for such a policy that would emerge among Iraq's neighbors and some of our allies. Indeed, the fear that military action would cause the dismemberment of Iraq, as many argue, fails to recognize that Iraq is slowly disintegrating along ethnic lines precisely because of Saddam's rule.

Bringing the Iraq debacle to some kind of closure should be a front-burner objective. Unlike a containment policy, a goal of "regime change" cannot be left open-ended. Urgent planning must begin now to defuse apprehensions about a U.S. role in Saddam's ouster. To prepare for this dramatic ratcheting-up of U.S. policy, we should mount an aggressive public information campaign aimed at the Iraqi people, the Arab world, our allies, and the American polity.

Now that we have defined Saddam's ouster as our goal, every day that he remains in power is a setback for U.S. interests, prestige, and credibility.

— Robert Satloff

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TIME TO PUT ON THE PRESSURE? Saddam looks happy here, but he is shakier than we think. Hitting him hard is an option.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China and Japan are critical to U.S. interests and a strategic Asian balance. We must engage them in a triangular embrace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHINA RISING: Nationalism has replaced communism as the dominant ideology. Chinese celebrate the Republic's 50th birthday in Tiananmen Square, 1999.

Shaping the new Pacific triangle

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

ALTHOUGH U.S. POWER REMAINS CENTRAL to the security of East Asia, no stable order will emerge there that excludes China. America's great diplomatic challenge is to build a new concert of Pacific powers based on a strong U.S.-Japan alliance, normal relations with China, and a reconciliation between Japan and China.

Unlike Europe, the Asia Pacific region did not develop a rich web of institutions during the Cold War, and China and Japan did not reconcile as did France and Germany in the context of the European Union and NATO. The receding of the Cold War has exposed the earlier historical conflicts in the region. China continues to worry about Japan's military (and nuclear) potential, and it frequently refers to the Japanese aggression in the 1930s. At the same time, it worries that America has hegemonic ambitions in the region.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has also underscored America's preponderance in the new regional balance of power. But America's regional muscle is acceptable because the United States is a distant power with no local territorial claims. The stabilizing American presence makes local arms races unnecessary. Moreover, many Asians, such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, believe that our forward deployments have fostered the political stability that has underpinned ➔

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia's economic miracle. That is why the presence of U.S. forces is welcome in nearly all Asian capitals.

With China's power rising and America's economic stake in the region growing, it is time for the United States to rethink its grand strategy toward East Asia. We face at least five major policy options:

1. Withdraw troops and pursue the Atlantic partnership. Some who believe the future entails a clash of civilizations advocate this policy, but it is costly and unlikely. History, geography, demographics, and economics make the United States a Pacific power. America's military presence is generally welcomed and enhances our influence in the region. Because of Japanese support, it costs the United States less to keep troops in Japan than in the continental United States.

2. Create a local balance of power. Some neo-realists advocate this policy. America would withdraw from formal alliance with Japan and let a local balance with China evolve. However, this would likely lead to a remilitarized Japan and an arms race in the region that, ironically, could make any U.S. involvement both more costly and more risky.

3. Create regional security institutions. As a supplement to bilateral alliances, such institutions make sense, but they are weak reeds and not easily or quickly developed. European institutions evolved over decades. A regional institutional strategy alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient framework for Asian stability.

4. Create a coalition to contain China. Put bluntly, this would not work. Sanctions and isolation are less likely than are economic growth and engagement to produce liberalization. Moreover, this policy exaggerates Chinese power and discounts changes already underway in China and the possibility that China can evolve to define its interests as a responsible power. If we treat China as an enemy now, we are likely to guarantee ourselves an enemy in the future, especially since nationalism is rapidly replacing communism as the dominant Chinese ideology. Finally, it would be virtually impossible to persuade China's neighbors to form a containment coalition unless they perceived China as a threat, which they currently do not.

5. Maintain a formal alliance with Japan and establish normal relations with China. Stability in East Asia depends on a U.S.-Japan-China triangle of relations. Though this relationship is not an equilateral triangle — Japan is a U.S. treaty ally — all three sides of the triangle count, since no stable regional security regime can exclude China. Each of the three nations has a manifest interest in regional stability that allows prosperity to flourish for all. The reinvigorated American alliance with Japan is critical to this strategy. It means that China cannot play a Japan card against the United States to dramatically reduce America's presence and influence in the region. From that position of strength, the United States can engage China as a normal country as its power grows.

"China has become a political football in American domestic politics. It is neither the strategic partner proclaimed by the Clinton Administration, the strategic competitor described by George W. Bush, nor the giant threat seen by many on the left and right in Congress."

Challenges

This U.S. strategy of maintaining a formal alliance with Japan and normal relations with China faces three major challenges: China itself, Taiwan, and North Korea. The three challenges are related, but each poses unique problems. And central to all three is an understanding of Chinese power. In recent years, China has become a political football in American domestic politics, and that has exaggerated its position. It is neither the strategic partner proclaimed by the Clinton Administration, nor the strategic competitor described by George W. Bush, nor the giant threat seen by many on the left and right in Congress.

Yet China is certain to become a dominant economic force in Asia. Growth rates of 8 to 9 percent per year have led to a tripling of its GNP in less than two decades. At the same time, China faces short-term problems with its state-owned enterprises, its shaky banking system, and the value of its currency. If China fails to make essential reforms, bottlenecks and growing income inequality could slow growth considerably. Even at the higher growth rates, China will lag well behind both the United States and Japan in per capita income.

With its economy growing, China's military strength is likely to increase over the next few decades. Even if that does not make China a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEGS OF THE TRIANGLE. Top: Chinese President Jiang Zemin, left, listens to Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at Akasaka Palace during the first-ever visit to Japan by a Chinese head of state. Below: President Clinton reviews a Japanese honor guard at the same palace during a separate visit.

global power or one regionally equivalent to the United States, it does mean that China is likely to look more awesome to its neighbors, and its enhanced capabilities will mean that any American military tasks will require greater forces and resources. But China will not be a global challenger to the United States, nor will it be able to exercise regional hegemony so long as the United States stays involved in East Asia and maintains its alliance with Japan.

The Clinton administration's China policy has not been a model of consistency, particularlyin the efforts to promote human rights, and the rhetoric has sometimes been out of relation to the reality. Nonetheless, Clinton's East Asia policy has generally been in harmony with the best of the five strategy options outlined above. Solidifying the alliance with Japan was ➔

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The danger is that North Korea may misjudge America's temper and set too high a price for stopping missile exports. The United States should enlist China's help in persuading Pyongyang not to overplay its hand."

a major accomplishment. Failing to bring China's trade within the rule-based framework of the World Trade Organization during the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji was a serious mistake. Clinton's own 1998 trip to China helped restore cordial relations with Beijing, but he erred in tilting too far toward China's position on Taiwan and in not visiting Japan on the way home to reassure a nervous ally.

Taiwan is obviously central to any China policy. Because of history and the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has to walk a tightrope between risking war with China and abandoning the people of Taiwan. It is essential to understand that nationalism has become more important than communism in China; even the new generation believes that Taiwan is an integral part of China and worth fighting for. At the same time, Taiwan has become democratic and is unwilling to see itself submerged into the current Chinese system. The United States has an interest in protecting the freedom of Taiwan's people and markets, but not in the symbolism of a separate Taiwanese flag. We should be clear that our policy is: no move to unilateral independence by Taiwan and no use of force by China. Within that framework, we should encourage the two sides to bargain over allowing separate Taiwanese membership in a limited number of international organizations and more exchanges of goods and people across the strait.

If we can maintain such a dynamic status quo, differences may diminish over time as Taiwan contributes to change in China. Clinton could have made this more clear when he was in Shanghai by uttering a fourth "no" — "no use of force" — in addition to the three that recognize "one China." (These are: no to U.S. support for Taiwan's independence; no to "two Chinas;" no to one Taiwan and one China.) On the other hand, those in Congress who are pressing legislation that openly commits the United States to defend Taiwan under any circumstances may encourage Taiwanese politicians to take risks that could jeopardize their own freedoms, as well as involve the United States in an unnecessary conflict. The best course is to stick with a framework that has accommodated dramatic political evolution on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

The third security challenge is dealing with North Korea's hermetic and erratic regime. The news that North Korea has agreed to freeze missile tests pending talks with the United States is a welcome first fruit of the initiative launched last year by former Defense Secretary William Perry. Yet it is a modest step, easily reversible by both sides. Pyongyang can quickly decide to launch another Taepo Dong 1 missile, and the United States can just as quickly decide to re-impose the sanctions that it relaxed.

The situation in North Korea remains highly uncertain. The secretive and isolated regime remains difficult for Americans and other outsiders to understand, and relations are complicated by Pyongyang's aggressive style of diplomacy. With an army that is more than one million strong, two-thirds of which is stationed within 62 miles of the demilitarized zone, North Korea continues to pose a conventional military threat to South Korea and the U.S. forces stationed there. And although the nuclear program at Yongbyan is frozen and subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the North Koreans would have access to enough plutonium to make half a dozen nuclear weapons if they decided to expel the inspectors.

Some observers believe that North Korea is falling apart and therefore poses less of a threat than before. It is true that its economy has cratered and defectors are emerging with credible reports of large-scale starvation. But this only makes the situation more volatile—Pyongyang might act recklessly if it feels cornered. The results would be devastating for the Korean peninsula and could, once again, bring the United States into conflict with China. The right response is to keep South Korean and U.S. forces in a state of high readiness to deter such action, while encouraging North Korea to open its economy and society and engage in political dialogue with South Korea.

The Perry initiative outlines two tracks for the future of U.S. relations with North Korea. A cooperative track involves a bargain in which North Korea forgoes missile tests and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exports and keeps its nuclear program frozen and under IAEA inspection. In return, the United States removes economic sanctions and grants diplomatic recognition to North Korea. If the first track fails, the second track is one of enhanced deterrence and containment of North Korea by a strengthening of forces in the region.

The danger is that Pyongyang may misjudge America's temper and set too high a price for, say, stopping missile exports. The Perry plan explicitly rejects paying such a price on the assumption that it would just whet North Korean appetites and be rejected by the U.S. Congress, many of whose members are already angered by North Korean coercive diplomacy. The United States should try to enlist China's help in persuading the North Koreans not to overplay their hand. It would be a tragic twist of fate if Pyongyang, in bargaining too hard and clumsily, were to spurn the Perry plan's cooperative track and turn an opportunity to escape isolation into a crisis.

Conclusion

The United States' role as a stabilizer and a reassurance against the rise of hostile hegemonic states in Asia is strongly in our national interest. We need to stay involved because events and actors in the region can hurt us and because Americans want to influence distant governments and organizations on a variety of issues, including terrorism, the environment, human rights, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nowhere is this more true than in East Asia, where we can also benefit from participating in one of the most dynamic parts of the world economy. Alliance with Japan and engagement with China as a normal country is the right long-run U.S. strategy. Such a triangular concert of powers is the best way to advance America's deeper interests in East Asia. ■



RATTLING ROCKETS: A poster shows three North Korean missiles locked on to a plane marked "Washington, Seoul, Tokyo."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Promoting *real* democracy

by Larry Diamond

IN THE LAST QUARTER-CENTURY, the number of democracies in the world has nearly tripled, from 40 to 117. This should be good news, but there's a catch: Many of these regimes are *illiberal* democracies.

Illiberal democracies have regular, more or less "free and fair" elections, but they lack some of the underpinnings of *liberal* democracy: civilian supremacy over the military, an independent judiciary, a free parliament, a constitution that protects liberties, and a vigorous civil society.

It is these deeper structures of democracy, not the mere fact of elections, that constrain governments' conduct at home and abroad. The adage that democracies rarely go to war with each other applies only to truly liberal democracies, which are more likely to treat their own citizens with dignity, to resolve disputes by peaceful means, to cooperate with other nations, and to adhere to international treaties and norms of achievement.

It follows that there is no more important condition for international peace and security today — and thus for America's national security — than helping to develop the institutions and values of liberal democracy.

More than 60 percent of the world's nations have some form of democratic government. Many of the remaining countries➔

Larry Diamond is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.

VOTING FOR THE FIRST TIME:
A black South African casts her ballot.
The challenge: **how to deepen and consolidate the new and tentative democracies of the third wave, such as Brazil, Thailand, the Philippines and South Africa.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy is spreading as never before, but its structures are often wobbly and *illiberal.* How we can bolster the institutions of *liberal* democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lack the conditions for a democratic transition, at least in the short run. That means that we are unlikely to witness a repeat anytime soon of the transformative surge in the number of democracies that were spawned by the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the next administration will face huge challenges: how to deepen and consolidate the new and tentative democracies of the third wave, such as Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, and the Philippines; how to prevent the erosion and breakdown of particularly troubled democracies, such as Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Venezuela; how to foster favorable conditions for democratic change in the remaining authoritarian countries, most notably China but also including Cuba, Burma, Egypt, Iran, and the Congo; how to strengthen the commitment of the United Nations and other international and regional bodies to preserving and protecting democratic institutions and values. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and independent groups like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation, the U.S. government is spending an estimated $400 million each year to assist democratic transitions around the world. That sounds like a lot until one considers that it is only one-tenth of one percent of what we spend on defense. In fact, we should spend more. The spread of liberal democracy creates a world that is friendlier to American interests and values and thus safer — a crucial investment in our long-term security.

"We are unlikely to witness a repeat any time soon of the transformative surge in the number of democracies that were spawned by the end of the Cold War."

Consolidating liberal democracy requires the hard, methodical work of institution building. New democracies need help in modernizing legal codes; training lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and legal aid officers; establishing legislative research services and countercorruption agencies; enhancing the skills of local, elected councilors and mayors; making

HANGING ON:
Cuba's Fidel Castro. *The challenge:* how to foster conditions for democratic change in the remaining authoritarian countries such as China, Burma, Egypt, Iran, the Congo and Cuba.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political parties more internally transparent and democratic; diffusing methods of dialogue and negotiation to build consensus behind needed market reforms; cultivating the tools and ethics of energetic but responsible news media; and crafting effective curricula for education in democratic citizenship.

Here is a brief survey of democratic prospects around the world:

Europe

First in Southern Europe, and now in Central and Eastern Europe, a powerful incentive has been the prospect of integration into the great security and economic communities of the West: NATO and the European Union. No external force will do more to secure and deepen democracy in the region than continuing integration. This is the single most compelling rationale (beyond even the need to enhance regional security) for NATO enlargement. What matters most for the new Europe is continued economic integration and reform on both sides of the old East-West divide. We should use the powerful incentive of membership in the Western economic club — and the lure of Western investment — to push for market reforms in the liberalizing societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we should support enlargement of the European Union to include those countries that meet the criteria of political and economic reform.

It is also crucial that we remain engaged with the successor states of the former Soviet Union. There, democracy is generally on much weaker ground, and many regimes have reverted to authoritarian rule behind an electoral façade. However, several countries, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, are struggling to institutionalize democratic elections as the only acceptable means for achieving power. Now is the time to encourage, monitor, and assist these difficult long-term processes of ➔

"The spread of liberal democracy creates a world that is friendlier to American interests and values and thus safer – a crucial investment in our long-term security."

HEAVY-HANDED LEADER:
Peru's Alberto Fujimori. *The challenge:* how to prevent the erosion and breakdown of particularly troubled democracies such as Peru, Russia, Turkey and Pakistan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

democratic change, not to dismiss and abandon them.

The Americas

In the Americas, the next frontier for regional integration is to enlarge the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a hemispheric free-trade zone. This is a daunting challenge that will require extraordinary vision and persuasive power by a new U.S. president, but economic good times are the right time to make such a move. Removing barriers to free trade throughout the Americas will do more than stimulate economic growth; opening markets will also promote political reform and modernization. By de-nationalizing banks and industries, opening highly regulated sectors to competition, and adopting more rigorous fiscal and monetary policies, many Latin American countries have also undermined the power of old political oligarchies. And since a new Inter-American Free Trade Agreement (IFTA) would require more uniform labor and environmental standards, it would strengthen efforts to promote social justice and government responsiveness in the emergent democracies of the region.

"Governments that are committed to strengthening markets and political pluralism deserve more aid, including debt relief. Governments that waffle on these commitments should be denied international aid and loans."

In 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS) took an important step toward the collective defense of democracy by adopting the Santiago Resolution, providing for immediate consultations and action in the event of the overthrow of a democratic government. Because of the automatic sanctions that are now invoked, both by the United States unilaterally and by the OAS collectively (as well as by the European states), blatant military coups have been deterred or reversed (in Guatemala and Paraguay, for example). Ironically, the principal threat to democracy in the region now comes from elected civilian presidents. Among these are: Alberto Fujimori, who suspended the Congress and then abused human rights in Peru; and Hugo Chavez, the leader of a 1992 military coup attempt who is shaping a new constitution to aggrandize his power in Venezuela. The OAS needs to draw the line at such attempts to construct semi-authoritarian rule behind a civilian constitutional facade. Countries that flout democratic principles should stand at risk of suspension from the OAS and from the prospective IFTA as well.

Africa

Now is the time for a new bargain between Africa and the West that could strengthen democratic structures by swapping debt for democracy and development for good governance. The dependence of African states on international aid, finance, and investment makes it possible to provide tangible incentives for liberalizing reforms and to impose penalties on those regimes that cling to corrupt and abusive practices. Aid should be conditioned on economic liberalization, political freedom, and accountability. Emphasis should be placed on redirection of budgetary priorities away from military and other unproductive spending and toward human and physical capital. Governments that are committed to strengthening markets and political pluralism deserve more aid, including debt relief. Governments that waffle on these commitments should be denied international aid and loans. Even in the most authoritarian situations, however, the international community needs to seek out and support the civil society groups that are actively engaged in development, democratization, and accountability.

Since a disproportionate share of Africa's 18 or so democracies lie in southern Africa, that end of the continent now has a unique opportunity for regional democratic development and cooperation, which we should support. In addition, we should encourage African democracies to drop their rhetoric of "non-intervention" concerning other members of the Organization of African States; within their own ranks, they should press issues and standards of democracy, human rights, and honest government.

Asia

Ultimately, the creation of a democratic world depends in no small measure on the creation of a democratic China. This will be one of the most difficult foreign-policy challenges for the next several administrations, and it requires a careful, steady balance between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principle and a pragmatic, long-term vision. If China is going to develop democracy, it must continue to develop economically. Even as China represses dissent, economic development is creating a more sophisticated, attentive, pluralistic, and autonomously organized society. This is fertile ground for long-term democratic change. For this reason, in part, nothing will be gained for democracy or other U.S. interests by using trade as a weapon to punish China for its reprehensible record on human rights. However, there must be a principled track to our policy that seeks to expose and condemn China's grave violations of human rights, while working privately as well as in international forums to end outrageous practices. There must also be an institution-building track, which quietly works with a variety of Chinese actors to improve legal training and procedures, the administration of competitive elections at the local level, and the capacities of organizations outside the state.

Despite Asia's image as a bastion of authoritarian values, democracy is gaining momentum. Throughout the region, especially in such crucial countries as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, the United States should actively support political and economic reforms designed to strengthen the judicial process, enhance governmental and corporate accountability, empower civil society, and improve international competitiveness. We must stay engaged with Indonesia to encourage a complete transition to democracy.

Collective Action for Democracy

The Clinton administration deserves credit for winning greater international acceptance of democracy and human rights as the standards of political legitimacy. In April 1999, for example, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution (with only Cuba and China abstaining) affirming democracy as a human right and asking the United Nations to promote and consolidate democracy around the world.

Yet progress toward creating regional and international structures for the promotion of democracy is not likely to come through aggressive, high-profile American initiatives. Our status as the lone superpower, with a sense of mission and a colossal military-technological advantage, generates widespread resentment around the world. Overzealous U.S. efforts would likely be rejected even by our allies as expressions of hegemonic ambition. Rather, the promotion of democratic principles and new collective arrangements to defend and advance them must be initiated by other democracies or by a very broad collaboration in which the United States is active but not visibly in the lead. We must pursue a shrewd and subtle strategy of democratic enlargement and encouragement — "leading from behind."

The U.S. role in promoting democratic development and institution-building (within states and among communities of states) is also threatened by what most of the world perceives as a yawning contradiction between our rhetoric on behalf of international law and our political behavior with regard to treaties, human rights, and the United Nations. The U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty stunned the world and was widely interpreted as hypocritical and damaging to arms control efforts. We are also faulted for our failure to pay our U.N. arrears on time and to ratify major human rights conventions, such as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the provisions for an International Criminal Court. These counterproductive positions damage the moral and political stature we need to advance democracy in the world.

We live in a world that has more democracies and awards more legitimacy to democratic norms than ever before in history. This provides the world's most powerful democracy a unique opportunity and responsibility: to sustain and advance international democratic momentum. The question is whether we have the patience, the wisdom, the maturity, and the leadership to promote the structures and initiatives that will build a democratic world for the long run. ■

"Nothing will be gained for democracy or other U.S. interests by using trade as a weapon to punish China for its reprehensible record on human rights. However, there must be a principled track to our policy that seeks to expose and condemn China's grave violations."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The price of leadership

Some complain that international engagement costs too much. But it may be the best investment America makes.

by Steven J. Nider

As we enter the new century, America's economic, technological and military might is unchallenged. Yet just as our international influence has reached new heights, a growing number of Americans seem unwilling to pay the price of U.S. global leadership. Neo-isolationist sentiment is swelling in Congress, which has sharply cut funding for America's international operations despite the fiscal surplus in our Treasury.

The costs of leadership are not trivial. Even though U.S. military budgets have fallen by a third since their Cold War peak in the mid-1980s, we still spend as much on defense every year as the next ten highest-spending countries combined. That sizable investment, however, undergirds American efforts to build a safer, more peaceful world. Through overseas deployments, U.S. forces are shaping events all around the world. They serve to maintain the balance of power in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. They degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors. They force Slobodan Milosevic and his army to stay out of Kosovo. In short, we must maintain the strongest, best trained, best equipped military in the world because U.S. strength is the ballast of the new international system.

But true security results from the marriage of power to diplomacy. We must pay attention to what President Clinton has called America's "diplomatic readiness." Yet the Republican-led Congress often threatens to undermine U.S. diplomacy with budget cuts. Last summer it slashed the administration's budget for international affairs by more than

International Comparison of Military Spending

Military spending in billions of U.S. dollars, 1997-1998



Source: *The Military Balance*, 1997–1998, Nov. 1997, International Institute of Strategic Studies

Spending on International Affairs

Spending on international affairs, which includes foreign aid, as a percentage of the federal budget, 1960–1997



Source: Budget of the United States Government, fiscal year 1999

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$2 billion, or nearly 14 percent. This forced President Clinton to veto the foreign operations bill for fiscal year 2000. And for good reason: the President pointed out that the bill appropriated about 40 percent less than what America spent on international engagement in 1985.

Most of the funds for the administration's international affairs budget appeared close to restoration by late 1999. But the Republican refusal to pay $1 billion in arrears to the United Nations had for years made us the world's No. 1 debtor to the organization, damaging our international influence. At the same time, we ranked dead last among industrialized nations in the share of gross domestic product devoted to foreign aid.

Although many Americans are under the impression that we spend 15 percent or more of the federal budget on foreign aid, the amount is in fact less than one percent. Yet these expenditures are effective in part because American dollars leverage the contributions of others. For example, in speeding recovery in the Balkans or preserving stability on the Korean peninsula. It is easier to persuade others to do their part when we are clearly doing ours.

The truth is that money spent on international engagement is the best investment we can make. If we underfund our diplomacy, we will end up overusing our military. As President Clinton has said, "the costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war." The Republican resistance to paying the full price of U.S. global leadership is a classic example of the adage "a penny wise and a pound foolish." We should make our international programs as admired and effective as our military. ■

"We must pay attention to what President Clinton has called America's 'diplomatic readiness.' Yet the Republican-led Congress threatens to undermine U.S. diplomacy with buget cuts."

Dwindling Forces, Growing Commitments

The number of Americans under arms has declined dramatically...



Source: Department of Defense

Rogue States That Possess Weapons of Mass Destruction

	Chemical Program	Biological Program	Nuclear Program
North Korea	X	X	Limited
Iran	X	X	X
Iraq	X	X	Limited
Syria	X	X	None
Libya	X	X	Limited

Source: Department of Defense, *Poliferation Threat and Response*, 1996

Steven J. Nider is director of the Defense Working Group at the Progressive Policy Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

People to Government: Stay engaged

by Mark J. Penn

While Americans don't want to be the world's cop, they don't want to retreat into isolationism, either. They expect strong leadership *and* global engagement for security and humanitarian reasons. And they would prefer to pursue international goals with our allies, rather than going it alone.

Since the Cold War ended a decade ago, America has been working toward a new vision and set of priorities for its foreign policy. As this vision comes into focus, we set out to examine the ideas Americans have today about the role the United States should play in the world as the next century begins.

Our findings are based on a new nationwide telephone poll of 511 registered voters conducted for the DLC by Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates on September 28-29, 1999. The poll's margin of error is +/- 4.4 percent.

The highlights of the survey include:

- Americans support the United States' role as a global leader and reject the idea that the U.S. should keep to itself and not be involved in world affairs.
- Americans strongly support active U.S. involvement in international institutions like the UN and NATO. They also believe the U.S. should work through multinational forces when undertaking military action.
- Americans believe nuclear weapons are now more of a threat than a necessity. With the end of the Cold War, Americans think that U.S. nuclear policy should shift from assuring a credible nuclear deterrent to phasing out nuclear weapons around the world.
- Americans concede humanitarian crises can be a sufficient grounds for U.S. military intervention. Indeed, the use of the military is now considered part of a continuum of potential foreign policy responses, rather than a distinctly different type of response to be used only in very unusual circumstances.
- Americans' top foreign policy priorities are to stop the flow of illegal drugs and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- Americans support our current policy of engagement toward China but consider China a threat that needs to be watched. They support a policy of continued engagement toward Russia as well.

Mark J. Penn is the president of Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates, Inc., and the pollster to President Clinton.
Research and polling assistance provided by Jeff Epstein.

Full results of this poll can be found at http://www.dlc.org/blueprint/winter2000/poll.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOT ISOLATIONISTS: American troops deep in Saudi Arabia, preparing to take the fight to Saddam Hussein during Desert Storm.

The Poll

1. American Foreign Policy: Engaged or Isolationist?

America remains the "indispensable nation" in world affairs today, according to U.S. voters. They believe the U.S. must choose an active role in the world over isolation. And they accept, within limits, a foreign policy driven as much by American values as by national interests.

By a solid majority of 56 percent to 40 percent, voters say that the United States sometimes needs to get involved in regional conflicts that do not directly threaten our national interests because we are often the only country able to maintain world peace and prevent humanitarian disasters.

Among the most likely to support U.S. involvement in such conflicts are two groups whose general world-view was framed by the events of the post-Cold war decade. Sixty-six percent of Generation Xers (20-34 years old) support humanitarian interventions, as do 64 percent of those who frequently use a computer at work and like to work as part of a team (Wired Workers).

Q: Which is closer to your view of the proper role of the U.S. in the world?

The U.S. sometimes needs to get involved in regional conflicts that do not directly threaten U.S. interest because we are often the only country able to maintain world peace and prevent humanitarian disasters such as Kosovo and East Timor.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
56	65	44	59	64	66

The U.S. should only act to protect our own national interests because it is not our responsibility to keep peace around the world.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
40	31	54	36	34	32

→

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, with recent high-profile U.S. involvement in military actions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, and East Timor, Americans think that our current level of international engagement is about high enough. Half say that we are either not engaged enough or engaged the right amount in the world's problems, and 48 percent say that we are too engaged. In general, Republicans would prefer a more isolationist approach to foreign policy while Democrats are most likely to think that the current level of international engagement is appropriate.

In general, do you think the U.S. is currently too engaged in the world's problems, not engaged enough, or engaged just about the right amount?



When the subject shifts from international engagement in general to trade and economic globalization in particular, voters express some ambivalence. Forty-six percent say the U.S. should take a leadership role in expanding global trade because it benefits the U.S. economy, virtually identical to the percentage who say the U.S. should slow the trend towards globalization because it hurts American workers and drives jobs overseas. Here, too, Generation Xers (52/41) and Wired Workers (54/42) are more supportive of globalization than the average. Males as well are somewhat more likely to favor expanding trade (51/43).

Q: Which is closer to your view of the proper role of the U.S. in the world?

The U.S. should take a leadership role in expanding global trade because it benefits the U.S. economy.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
46	45	45	49	54	52

The U.S. should slow the trend towards globalization because it hurts American workers and drives jobs overseas.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
47	50	52	45	42	41

People's satisfaction with the current level of the United States' involvement internationally is evident in that a majority think our spending on foreign aid and defense should each be kept about the same, rather than expanded or cut back.

Foreign aid



National defense



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. International Organizations

While Americans think the U.S. has a responsibility to stay actively engaged in the world, they also believe that the U.S. should not act unilaterally in foreign affairs. Seven in ten — including large majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents — say it is more important than ever for the U.S. to play an active leadership role in strengthening international institutions in order to create a safe and prosperous world. Only one quarter say the U.S. should reduce our military commitments abroad and go our own way in world affairs.



This is partly due to a greater acceptance of international operations and partly due to the belief that sharing the cost of peace can be less of a drain on the U.S. Treasury.

Q: Which is closer to your view?

Since the Cold War is over and the U.S. is the only superpower, we should reduce our military commitments abroad and go our own way in world affairs.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers
26	22	32	26	24

Since the Cold War is over and the U.S. is the only superpower, it is more important than ever for the U.S. to play an active leadership role in strengthening international institutions in order to create a safe and prosperous world.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers
70	75	64	72	75

U.S. role in the UN



U.S. role in NATO



Public backing for American engagement in international institutions extends to the United Nations and NATO. Eighty-one percent of voters support (56 percent strongly support) a continued active role of the U.S. in the United Nations. Likewise, 79 percent support (50 percent strongly support) a continued active role of the U.S. in NATO. ➔

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The survey also found support for the proposition that NATO should be focused on new missions. Just 29 percent think that NATO should remain a defensive alliance that acts only when a member country is under direct military attack, compared to nearly two-thirds who think that NATO's post-Cold War role should also address such threats in Europe as ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and the spread of nuclear weapons. This result vindicates the role that NATO played in Kosovo and suggests that Americans expect NATO to play a similar proactive role in future European crises.

Q: Which is closer to your view?

NATO should remain a defensive alliance that acts only when a member country is under direct military attack.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
29	24	36	29	28	24

Now that the Cold War is over, NATO's role should be changed to also address such threats in Europe as ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and the spread of nuclear weapons.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
65	72	61	67	70	73

3. Conditions for Intervention

Working in concert with other countries and international organizations is not merely an abstract concept for Americans. They want the U.S. to act through international organizations or as part of multinational coalitions. This is true whether the crisis is a humanitarian one or one that threatens U.S. economic interests. In both cases, strong majorities said that the U.S. should intervene militarily only once a multinational force has been put together.

Americans believe there should be a somewhat higher bar for U.S. military intervention when the internal affairs of another country are the issue. People are not entirely comfortable with the idea of the U.S. unilaterally sitting in judgment of other governments' behavior.

Q: Should the U.S. intervene militarily only once a multinational force has been put together or should the U.S. intervene militarily on its own? (Only with multinational force/On its own)

Suppose one country was engaged in such widespread ethnic killing and human rights abuses that the U.S. government concluded it had to intervene militarily.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind
69/27	68/27	80/16	61/35

Suppose one country invaded another country where the U.S. had substantial economic interests, and the U.S. government concluded it had to intervene militarily.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind
55/34	58/27	56/43	52/36

At the same time, Americans are willing to support the use of U.S. military forces for humanitarian crises — but in conjunction with a multinational force, nearly six in ten said that ethnic killing and human rights abuses in other countries calls for intervention.

The recent intervention in East Timor posed this issue to the American public. Should the U.S. send military support halfway around the world to this small province where the U.S. has relatively few economic interests and where the crisis was entirely contained within the borders of another sovereign nation? By a substantial margin, people say we were right to take the initiative provide troops for the multinational peacekeeping force.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Q: Which is closer to your view?

The United States should be willing to use military force against other countries only when they directly threaten U.S. security.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
38	33	44	36	33	32

Ethnic killing and human rights abuses in other countries can also be a reason to intervene in some circumstances.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Wired Workers	GenX
59	64	52	59	66	64

4. The Appropriate Level of U.S. Response to Foreign Crises

Public concerns that every use of military power runs the risk of turning into another Vietnam have apparently been eased by the recent U.S. military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, where American casualties have been nearly non-existent. Americans now array limited military force on a continuum with diplomatic and economic pressure. As a general matter, people are willing to support military involvement in certain foreign crises, even in the abstract. And after the President's success in Kosovo, most turn to air strikes as one way to deal with tough international situations.

To test public attitudes on what level of force or pressure to apply, voters were presented with a series of potential crises and asked whether the U.S. should respond with diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, air strikes, ground troops, or nothing. Several of the scenarios were based on actual crises the U.S. has faced over the last decade, including, for example, the air attacks on sites the U.S. suspected were being used by terrorist Osama bin Laden, the Kosovo crisis and the Iraqi attack on Kuwait.

There are three key findings:

1) The percentage of Americans who say we should do nothing was below 11 percent for every scenario. They want at least some level of U.S. response in every case.

2) As many people support the use of air strikes as support the two non-military options (diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions). For example, the use of air strikes was the most popular choice when terrorists have attacked or threaten to attack U.S. interests.

3) Americans are willing to use ground troops in some circumstances, even when U.S. interests are not directly threatened. People are most willing to use U.S. ground troops "to stop a foreign government from widespread killing of its ethnic minorities," and in that scenario, people support the use of ground troops about as strongly as they support any of the other three options.

These are substantial numbers for a U.S. military response. Typically the first response to a foreign conflict is diplomacy, and it is only when diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis are exhausted, as happened in Kosovo, that force is used. It is at that point that the public is most receptive to arguments for resorting to military force. ➔

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Q: In this case, should the U.S. be willing to use diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, air strikes, ground troops, or nothing? (ranked by support for air strikes)

	Non-Military		Military		
	Diplomatic Pressure	Economic Sanctions	Air Strikes	Ground Troops	Nothing
To stop terrorists based in another country who have attacked U.S. interests	21	18	34	16	5
To stop terrorists based in another country who are threatening U.S. interests	25	18	29	17	4
To stop a foreign government from widespread killing of its ethnic minorities	24	20	22	20	8
To remove a dictator who is using widespread violence to hold power	24	28	21	16	6
To protect a non-democratic country that is a U.S. ally from being attacked by another country	29	21	17	15	9
To protect a non-democratic country where the U.S. has significant economic interests from being attacked by another country	33	28	15	9	9
To protect a democratic government from being taken over by a non-democratic government	34	22	14	12	11
To stop the trafficking of drugs into the U.S.	27	31	11	19	6
To protect the results of a democratic election from being undone through violence	39	25	5	15	10

5. Foreign Policy Priorities

Terrorism and nuclear proliferation remain the two top foreign policy concerns of Americans. With no overriding enemy or security threat today, Americans are worried less about the biggest and most powerful nations and more about the smallest forces that could create the most damage and ultimately be impossible to find or punish.

Q: What do you feel is the biggest threat to America's national security today?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind
Terrorism	21	21	23	19
Spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons	19	16	24	17
World economic instability	16	17	12	18
Drug trafficking	15	17	10	17
Unstable or hostile governments	10	9	9	11
International organized crime	5	7	3	4
Spying at Energy Department labs	3	1	7	2
Regional wars	3	3	1	3

Terrorism and the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are deemed to be the top threats to America's national security, not unstable or hostile governments such as Russia or China. Similarly, stopping the flow of illegal drugs, followed by efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation, top the list of Americans' foreign policy priorities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Q: Which of the following do you think should be the most urgent foreign policy priority for the United States?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind
Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S.	27	29	29	23
Preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons	26	22	27	31
Stopping ethnic killing and human rights abuse	12	19	11	8
Working to prevent regional wars that could threaten world peace	11	10	9	15
Combating international terrorism	10	11	10	9
Opening new markets for American products	6	6	8	4

6. Nuclear Arms Reduction

Not surprisingly, Americans want to reduce nuclear stockpiles around the world. People believe that the deterrent value of Cold War stockpiles is diminishing, given U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and the greatest nuclear threat coming from terrorists rather than countries. More than half agree with the statement, "The Cold War is over and the U.S. has clear superiority in conventional and high tech weaponry. As a result, we can significantly reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons to protect our security and deter threats to America."

The Cold War is over and the U.S. has clear superiority in conventional and high tech weaponry. As a result, we can significantly reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons to protect our security and deter threats to America. Do you agree, or disagree?



Nuclear policy should shift from figuring out how to create the most credible deterrent to phasing out nuclear weapons around the world according to most Americans. Almost seven in ten think the U.S. should lead all nuclear powers to phase nuclear weapons out of existence around the world.

Should U.S. lead an effort with all nuclear powers to phase nuclear weapons out of existence?



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A sensible step in that direction, according to 75 percent of respondents, would be for the U.S. Senate to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Support for eventual ratification of the treaty remains high despite the Senate's recent failure to muster the necessary two-thirds vote.

Q: The United States, along with over 150 other countries, has signed a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests worldwide. Do you favor or oppose the nuclear test ban treaty?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind
Favor	75	90	60	73
Oppose	21	8	35	22

Q: Some people say the Senate should sign the treaty because it will prevent new countries from developing nuclear weapons and will sharply reduce the threat of nuclear war. Others say the Senate should not sign the treaty because it will be difficult to enforce and other countries might cheat. Which is closer to your view?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind
Sign the treaty	60	75	49	52
Should not sign the treaty	33	18	44	41

7. China, Iraq, and Russia

When asked to focus on specific countries that concern Americans, China tops the list. On an open-ended question, over one-third (36 percent) identify China as the country posing the greatest threat to national security. Only 8 percent identify Russia as the greatest threat, underscoring the most dramatic shift in attitudes since the Cold War ended. It is worth noting that Republicans are far more leery of China (50 percent) than are Democrats (28 percent) or Independents (35 percent) — a sign of the deepening partisan divide on issues of national security and foreign policy.

The other country that continues to concern people is Iraq. One-fifth (21 percent) believe it to be the greatest threat to U.S. national security — a number that is perhaps even more significant since Iraq has not been in the news much recently. In fact, nearly 60 percent say that China or Iraq are the greatest threats. They are the only two countries that register in double digits.

Q: What nation do you consider the greatest threat to U.S. national security?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind	GenX	Wired Workers
China	36	28	50	35	24	35
Iraq	21	27	16	18	22	29
Russia	8	11	8	6	12	5
Iran	6	8	1	7	6	6
North Korea	5	4	3	6	9	7
Libya	1	1	2	1	1	2
Cuba	1	1	1	0	0	1

China

Though more people identify China as the country posing the greatest threat to U.S. security interests, it's more accurate to say that people think of China as a potential threat. For example, when asked whether China is a friend, an enemy, or neither, people say, by a large margin, that they do not perceive China to be a friend or an enemy.

U.S. voters think that China deserves careful watching, but they are not ready for a rupture in the current Sino-American relationship. For example, voters agree that the best policy toward China is constructive engagement, rather than punitive isolation, despite the annual argument over China's trade status. Nearly two thirds (65 percent)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support our current policy of engagement with China in order to move it toward greater economic and political freedom, including more than 60 percent of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.

China — friend, enemy, or neither?



Q: Which is the best way to encourage change in China?

By continuing to trade and constructively engage with China to keep it moving toward greater economic and political freedom.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	GenX	Wired Workers
65	61	65	69	64	70

To work with our allies to cut off trade with China to punish it for its crackdown on democracy.

All	Dem	Rep	Ind	GenX	Wired Workers
29	33	29	25	25	25

Americans would like to see the United States give greater support to Taiwan, especially when told that it has become a democracy, compared to the present policy that leaves Taiwan's status unchanged. But this is an example of a goal Americans favor in theory but can desert in practice. When asked about the "One China policy" Americans support it; when asked about greater independence for Taiwan, they support that as well. Typically, when relations with China worsen, Americans grow more reluctant to confront Beijing, while at times of relative stability, they tend to be more sympathetic to Taiwan's aspirations for greater international recognition.

Q: Current U.S. policy toward Taiwan can be summed up as "no independence for Taiwan, and no use of force by China to compel Taiwan to rejoin mainland China." Given this, which is closer to your view?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind	GenX
We should continue that policy.	37	42	31	36	41
Since Taiwan has become a democracy, the U.S. should support its moves toward independence, even if that provokes a confrontation with China.	55	51	61	55	48

Iraq

Iraq poses a very different problem. Voters say that the top priority must be to get rid of Saddam Hussein — even above containing the threat that Iraq might pose to other countries or ensuring the rights of ethnic minorities in Iraq. Keeping weapons inspectors in Iraq also receives strong support, indicating continuing concern that Iraq has still not been deterred from working to develop weapons of mass destruction. ➔

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Q: What should be the top goal of United States policy toward Iraq?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind	Male	Female
To remove Saddam Hussein from office	41	40	40	45	38	45
To keep inspectors in Iraq to make sure Iraq does not develop chemical or biological weapons	35	37	35	32	33	36
To contain the threat Iraq poses to other nations	11	11	14	10	15	8
To protect Iraq's ethnic minorities from oppression by the Iraqi government	8	10	6	7	8	8

Russia

As in China, constructive engagement with Russia is the best policy according to Americans, despite the recent news reports on Russian corruption and government incompetence. But because people do not perceive Russia as posing the same level of threat to U.S. security interests as China, the goal of engagement with Russia is less to contain Russian aggression than to help Russia in its attempts to strengthen its economy and protect its new democracy. Over three-quarters of respondents say that Russia is too important to be allowed to fail and that we should stay engaged while carefully monitoring how our support and international loans are used.

Q: Which is closer to your view?

	All	Dem	Rep	Ind
Some people blame the corruption and economic failures in Russia on U.S. policy, which supported large loans to Russia and strong backing to President Yeltsin's attempts at reform. These critics say we should now disengage and let Russia sink or swim on its own.	20	19	19	23
Russia is too important to be allowed to fail and we should stay engaged but carefully monitor how our support and international loans are used.	77	79	76	77

8. Conclusion

Americans clearly want a global foreign policy in an increasingly global world. They are closer to Woodrow Wilson's internationalist views today than to Patrick Buchanan's neo-isolationist philosophy. International involvement in carefully selected situations and participation in organizations like NATO and the UN are seen as critical components of a 21st-century foreign policy.

Just as there is no overriding domestic political issue today but a host of smaller ones, foreign policy today is characterized by no dominant threat like the Cold War. Rather, the map is littered with smaller issues, such as terrorism and drugs, that require vigilance. The two larger issues confronting Americans are the need to stop nuclear proliferation and the need for successful relations with China. Americans' uncertainty about how the world will cope with these two problems is at the core of their concern about foreign policy today. Fundamentally, Americans believe in constructive engagement and international cooperation as the best approaches to reduce these problems, not a return to isolationism. ■

Contributing Photographers: AP/Worldwide Photos – inside cover, 5, 7, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 25, 34, 36, 38, 41, 43, 49, 50, 53, 54, 58, 61, 63 / Corbis Images/Corbis AFP – cover, 30, 31, 65 / Magnum Photos – Abbas 52, 66, James Nachtwey 19, / National Geographic Image Collection – Steve Raymen 73 / U.S. Navy – Jeff Viano 27, / SABA – Peter Blakely 47, Keith Dannemiller 67, Sergi Guneyev 44, / Sipa Press – 57, Alaxandra Boulat 10, J.Witt/A.Facelly 52, / Sygma – Les Stone 45, Ilka Uimonen 14, John VanHasselt 9, / U.S. Geological Survey – 33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ideas that work . . .

DLC IDEAS are bold, innovative, and in tune with the times; they promote **TRADITIONAL VALUES** like opportunity, responsibility, and community; and, most importantly, they work. Ideas developed or promoted by the **DLC** and put into action by **PRESIDENT CLINTON** — an economic strategy of fiscal discipline, expanded trade and investments in people; expanding the earned income tax credit; **REPLACING WELFARE** with a system of work; **REINVENTING GOVERNMENT**; community policing; national service — are improving the lives of tens of millions of our fellow citizens.

The challenges ahead . . .

As a new century approaches, America faces daunting **NEW CHALLENGES:** to assure American leadership in a world economy; to build a world–class education system; to provide retirement security for generations to come; and to equip citizens with the skills they need to prosper in the **NEW ECONOMY.**

These are tall orders. Politics as usual will not do.

"These words — opportunity, responsibility, community — came to identify and embody a new approach to government and politics, tying our oldest, most enduring values to the Information Age... We said we were New Democrats, and we called our approach the Third Way...These same ideas are reviving center-left political parties throughout the industrialized world as people everywhere struggle to put a human face on the global economy...and it all started with the DLC...Today, less than 15 years after we started, the ideas pushed by the DLC are literally sweeping the world."

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, DECEMBER 2, 1998

JOIN **THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF THOUSANDS OF LEADERS WORKING TO TURN NEW DEMOCRAT IDEAS INTO ACTION.**

DLC
Democratic Leadership Council

Membership is $50, $20 for students.

Phone: 800-546-0027 or in the Washington, DC metro area 202-544-6172 **Fax:** 202-544-5002
E-mail: webmaster@dlcppi.org Visit our Web site at http://www.dlcppi.org/joinform.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


THE POLITICS OF WIRED WORKERS • AMERICA'S NEW BLACK LEADERS
THE NEW
DEMOCRAT
CHARTER SCHOOLS
How Choice and Competition Are Transforming Public Education

THE NEW DEMOCRAT

The DLC flagship publication, published bimonthly. Its unique perspective spares neither Right nor Left, and gives you the substance, analysis, and arguments to challenge both.

To order a subscription to The New Democrat, please mail, fax, or email a written request to:

Democratic Leadership Council/TND
PO Box 15823
Washington, DC 20078-0800

You can also order on the web at: www.dlc.org

For fastest service, call **1-800-546-0027**.
An annual subscription to The New Democrat is $18 (USD).

Democratic Leadership Council
Blueprint
600 Pennsylvania Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20003

Non-Profit Organization
U.S. Postage Paid
Permit 3775
Washington, DC

Forward and Address Correction Requested

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED